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Abstract 
Policies for an Ecological Civilization 
by 
Cecilia H. Springer 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Energy and Resources 
University of California, Berkeley 
Professor David Anthoff, Chair 
 
China’s ecological civilization concept claims a new, Chinese model of promoting 
economic growth while reducing environmental pollution at the same time. This 
dissertation uses interdisciplinary methods to analyze two of China’s flagship ecological 
civilization policies, the national carbon market and the Belt and Road Initiative. While 
the national carbon market exemplifies China’s changing approach to domestic 
environmental policy, the Belt and Road Initiative is carrying the Chinese model of 
ecological civilization overseas. The first part of this dissertation focuses on China’s 
national carbon market. I use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to assess 
the interactions between a national carbon market and China’s ongoing structural 
economic transition, thereby yielding macro-scale evidence and policy suggestions for 
how China can fulfill ecological civilization goals of increasing GDP while reducing 
carbon dioxide emissions. Next, I investigate the carbon market from a qualitative 
perspective, assessing how emissions accounting is used as a foundation for policy-
making. I also explore the capacity building community that sustains the carbon market, 
asking broader questions about how Chinese neoliberalism informs the formation of the 
national carbon market. The second part of this dissertation focuses on the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI), situating it in the context of leakage, or relocation of production in 
response to environmental regulation. Through a novel empirical study, I test the 
assumption that BRI projects may be better or worse for the environment than other 
sources of finance. I then explore potential mechanisms of Chinese overseas finance 
exceptionalism, informing ongoing policy and advocacy debates about how to engage 
with the growing scale of China’s overseas investment.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“同志们！生态文明建设功在当代、利在千秋。我们要牢固树立社会主义生
态文明观，推动形成人与自然和谐发展现代化建设新格局，为保护生态环境
作出我们这代人的努力！” 
“Comrades! What we are doing today to build an ecological civilization will 
benefit generations to come. We should have a strong commitment to socialist 
ecological civilization and work to develop a new model of modernization with 
humans developing in harmony with nature. We must do our generation's share to 
protect the environment.” 
- Xi Jinping, address to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China, October 18, 2017 (Xinhua 2017) 1 
 
The concept of ecological civilization (生态文明) is now part of China’s constitution and 
contributes to the ideological framework for the country. The ecological civilization 
concept became the guiding principle for China’s environmental policy when Xi Jinping 
came into power in 2013, and it was written into the Five-Year Plan in 2015. China’s 
leaders are increasingly presenting ecological civilization not only as a response to 
problems of environmental degradation within China, but as a state-led vision for the 
global future that applies Chinese cultural and moral virtues to technological and political 
goals (Hansen et al. 2018).  
Ecological civilization stems from earlier concepts, such as ecological modernization, 
which calls for a reconciliation of the economy vs. environment dichotomy through the 
internalizing of environmental limits into capitalist processes (Cooper 2008), and green 
growth, economic growth that is environmentally sustainable (Ho and Wang 2014). Yet 
the ecological civilization concept also foregrounds China’s unique ability to solve this 
dichotomy by emphasizing China’s thousands of years of cultural heritage as well as its 
contemporary developmental prowess. Ecological civilization was in fact tailor-made by 
contemporary Chinese officials and scholars by selectively drawing on traditional 
Chinese texts to argue that historically, Chinese development was uniquely ecologically 
sound, in contrast to the Western model of development (Schmitt 2016). This parallels 
the widely held belief that only the Chinese Communist Party’s developmental model 
could have lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty after 1949. The notion is 
thus: With the Communist Party at the helm, China will show the world how to build an 
ecological civilization in which economic growth can continue while environmental 
challenges are easily overcome with technical and market solutions.   
To understand China’s vision of ecological civilization, one must investigate how 
government leaders enact and operationalize ecological civilization: through policy. For 
my dissertation, I use interdisciplinary methods to analyze two of China’s flagship 
                                                
1 Translation by Xinhua 
2 The terms ETS (emissions trading system) and carbon market are often used interchangeably. Since ETS 
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ecological civilization policies, ones that are frequently linked in their political discourse 
to ecological civilization because of their purported ability to grow the market economy 
and address environmental pollution at the same time. These two policies are the national 
carbon market and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While the national carbon market 
exemplifies China’s changing approach to domestic environmental policy, the Belt and 
Road Initiative is carrying the Chinese model of ecological civilization overseas. 
Why focus on these two policies? Besides being closely watched on the global stage, 
these policies have been pushed into the limelight by bureaucratic restructuring at the 
national level in China. The Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) assumed the 
responsibilities of many other departments when formed in 2018, including the 
management of China’s carbon market, which was previously under the purview of the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Around the same time, the 
Chinese government also formed the International Development Cooperation Agency 
(CIDCA) to consolidate China’s overseas development and aid activities for the first 
time. In parallel, Chinese universities and research organizations have created new 
institutes, centers, and work streams to inform and analyze these policies.  
The first part of this dissertation focuses on China’s national carbon market. China’s 
national carbon market has not launched according to its original timeline. Yet China’s 
national policymakers continue to dedicate resources to the policy, and it enjoys support 
from high-level leaders, despite clear conceptual and operational challenges. Part One of 
the dissertation aims to shed light on why this is happening. First, I assess the ecological 
civilization premise that economic growth and environmental protection can proceed 
together – a key motivation for China’s carbon market. I use a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) modeling framework to examine policy interactions between China’s 
national carbon market and the changing structure of China’s economy. Next, I 
investigate the carbon market from a qualitative perspective, assessing how efforts to 
standardize emissions accounting and build capacity are a productive foundation for 
policymaking. 
The second part of this dissertation focuses on the Belt and Road Initiative, a policy that 
increasingly faces international scrutiny for its potential environmental impacts. In a 
novel empirical study, I test the assumption, prevalent in media and advocacy discourse, 
that BRI projects are uniquely bad for the environment. Using plant-level data on coal-
fired power plants in Asia, I find that plants owned, managed, or built by Chinese 
companies tend to have lower emissions rates and higher energy efficiency than those 
associated with companies from other countries. I then contextualize and extend those 
results by identifying potential mechanisms through which China’s overseas projects 
might have different environmental impact than other projects. 
Both parts of this dissertation are informed by broad research questions about the 
economic and environmental impacts of Chinese policies, and how these impacts are 
related to the policymaking process. I combine computable general equilibrium 
modeling, field-based interviews and participant observation, and empirical economic 
analysis to assess these policies from interdisciplinary perspectives.   
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CHAPTER 2: ANATOMY OF A CARBON MARKET 
WHAT IS A CARBON MARKET? 
This chapter provides necessary context and background information for the subsequent 
two chapters on the carbon market in China. By doing so, it will lay out my theoretical 
frameworks for analysis of China’s carbon market. I begin with an overview of how 
carbon markets work from the perspective of economic theory.  
The rationale for implementing carbon pricing policies arises from the idea of 
externalities. An externality is an action that affects parties that have not participated in 
that action. Negative externalities refer to harmful impacts from transactions that aren’t 
included in the value of the transaction, such as pollution or traffic congestion. Positive 
externalities include research and development, which has positive benefits to society 
beyond the direct value of the R&D itself. In economic theory, inefficiency arises when 
externalities that could be removed from an additional transaction are not removed. 
Carbon pricing is meant to internalize the cost of the externalities of emitting carbon 
dioxide, namely the economic damages associated with climate change.  
There are two ways to price carbon: setting its quantity or price. Perhaps the most well-
known form of carbon pricing is a carbon tax, which sets the carbon price. The other 
major form is known as an emissions trading system (ETS)2, also called cap-and-trade or 
carbon market (though any pollutant can be regulated). This form sets a cap on the 
quantity of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions that can be emitted by regulated entities in a 
given jurisdiction.  
In economic theory, the carbon market is meant to incentivize polluters to reduce CO2 
emissions by requiring them to purchase emissions ‘allowances’ that represent the 
amount of carbon dioxide they emit. Allowances, also known as permits, give a firm the 
right to emit a certain amount of emissions. With a specified cap on the total amount of 
emissions the regulated firms can emit, the formation of a market to buy and sell these 
allowances is meant to allow polluters to achieve the specified reduction at least cost. 
The first operational emissions trading system was the U.S. Acid Raid Program, a sulfur 
dioxide emissions trading system that went into effect in the United States in 1995. In 
1997, the Kyoto Protocol took steps towards establishing international mechanisms for 
carbon trading. The largest carbon market to date is the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS), first started in 2005. Since then, carbon markets have been 
adopted to various extents in a few other countries and subnational regions, including 
Kazakhstan, South Korea, the northeastern United States, California, Quebec, Australia, 
and New Zealand (IETA 2019). China, though, has captured international attention with 
the promise of the world’s largest carbon market. If fully implemented according to the 
design proposed in its early plans, China’s carbon market could cover 50% of China’s 
                                                
2 The terms ETS (emissions trading system) and carbon market are often used interchangeably. Since ETS 
can refer to the trading of any kind of emissions, I use the term “carbon market” in this paper to refer to 
specifically carbon dioxide emissions, as well as to call attention to the conceptual importance of “market” 
in this policy process. 
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energy-related CO2 emissions, or nearly 15% of the world total.  
 
PARTIAL REFORM 
China exceeds all other countries in annual energy use and greenhouse gas emissions 
(Sandalow 2018). The carbon intensity of China’s economy (i.e. the carbon dioxide 
emissions per unit of GDP) is also quite high due to the use of abundant and low-cost 
domestic coal resources, although major energy efficiency policies have reduced the 
carbon intensity of the economy significantly in the past decade. From the 11th Five-Year 
Plan (2006-2010) onward, binding energy efficiency and emissions intensity targets have 
been put forth in China’s Five-Year Plans. China has also made voluntary energy and 
emissions commitments in other high-level policy venues, such as the United Nations 
climate negotiations, where this targets were formalized in their Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDCs).  
In the 1980s and 1990s, energy and environmental regulation in China took the form of 
command-and-control policies, such as pollution fines and forced shutdowns of polluting 
facilities. Since then, environmental regulators in China have become more receptive to 
market-based approaches for several reasons. First, command-and-control regulation is 
often costly, both in an economic and political sense – shutting down facilities can harm 
the local economy and antagonize industry and workers. Second, as market-oriented 
reform has proceeded since the start of the Reform and Opening Up (改革开放) era in 
the late 1970s, market-based policies have enjoyed support across many sectors.     
China’s leaders want to see sustained economic growth alongside the reduction of 
emissions intensity. Economic growth is the foundation of the current government’s 
political legitimacy, while climate change and environmental pollution are related to a 
complex set of domestic and international goals. Market-based environmental policy falls 
into a convenient middle ground between these two goals, promising economically 
efficient reduction of environmental harms that does not place undue burden on the 
economy. The ethos of market-based environmental policy meshes perfectly with the 
concept of ecological civilization. 
The carbon market, therefore, is an emblematic ecological civilization policy. It is one of 
the most significant of China’s suite of clean energy and climate policies over the past 
decade in terms of scope and political visibility. Architects of China’s carbon markets 
have cited various motivations for the policy. The carbon market is framed as a policy 
instrument for achieving major national climate targets, such as reducing carbon intensity 
60%-65% below 2005 levels by 2030, which is China’s pledge for the Paris Agreement 
on climate change. At the same time, the carbon market significantly diverges from 
China’s past command-and-control policies for energy and resource management due to 
its market-based approach (Duan and Zhou 2017). This effort represents a shift in 
regulatory strategy towards market-based mechanisms, which the Chinese government 
believes can achieve emissions reductions at lower cost and allow firms more flexibility 
in complying with regulations. In fact, the carbon market has been explicitly linked to the 
ecological civilization concept in its official development plan:  
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“建立碳排放权交易市场，是利用市场机制控制温室气体排放的重大举措，
也是深化生态文明体制改革的迫切需要，有利于降 低全社会减排成本，有
利于推动经济向绿色低碳转型升级。为扎 实推进全国碳排放权交易市场
（以下简称“碳市场”）建设工作， 确保 2017 年顺利启动全国碳排放交
易体系，根据《中华人民共 和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲
要》和《生态文明 体制改革总体方案》，制定本方案。”  
“Building a carbon market is an important measure that uses the market 
mechanism to control greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, as well as an urgent 
requirement for deepening reform of ecological civilization. It can help reduce 
society’s costs of emissions reduction, and promote the green and low-carbon 
economic transition and upgrading. To advance the development of a national 
emission trading scheme (ETS) and ensure its launch in 2017, this plan is 
formulated based on ‘The People’s Republic of China’s 13th Five-Year Plan for 
Economic and Social Development’ and ‘The Overall Plan on Ecological 
Civilization Reform.’ ” (NDRC 2017)3  
 
International scholars and media tend to highlight the international cooperative 
motivations of China’s carbon market, which has been lauded by Western institutions and 
frequently discussed in global forums such as the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Goron and Cassisa 2017). China’s carbon market has 
also been linked symbolically to narratives about China’s national development and 
security interests, the carbon market serving as “an integral part of the country’s climate 
change policy discourse that is shaped by international debates and wider geopolitical 
narratives” (Lo 2015). 
However, China has a mixed record of success in using market-based solutions to address 
environmental problems. China’s sulfur dioxide emissions trading system, piloted in the 
1990s, never became an institutionalized policy in the provinces that were supposed to 
adopt it (Tao and Mah 2009). It is important to note that although China’s economic 
reforms liberalized the structure of a number of industrial sectors, several key sectors the 
national carbon market proposes to regulate have either a dual-track system4 or a partially 
reformed pricing structure.  
In particular, the electric power sector – the first sector the national carbon market will 
regulate – poses challenges for the design and efficacy of the carbon market policy. 
China’s wholesale electricity markets, which are regionally managed, are not competitive 
in structure, meaning that the marginal cost of producing electricity does not determine 
the electricity price or the dispatch order for power generators. Thus, a carbon price 
imposed by the carbon market will not affect generator behavior by proportionally 
making more carbon-intensive generation more expensive, as is intended by the 
                                                
3 Translation by the Energy Foundation – see reference link 
4 China established the dual-track system (双轨制) during the reform era. The dual-track system allows 
coexistence of a planned pricing system and a market pricing system at the firm or sector level, with a share 
of production being sold in each track (Naughton 1995). 
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theoretical policy design. In order to pass on the carbon price to electricity consumers, 
several of China’s carbon market pilots require that large consumers of electricity must 
purchase and retire allowances for the electricity they consume, though this is not as 
effective as power sector reform (Munnings et al. 2016). While China’s carbon market 
policymakers are working on a cost pass-through mechanism for applying a carbon price 
to power generators for the national carbon market, the extent to which China’s 
electricity market hampers effectiveness of carbon pricing and whether efficient 
workarounds are possible remain unclear.  
Even if an effective mechanism is developed, there is still ongoing emblematic tension 
between the non-market nature of the reforming power sector and the theoretical 
assumption of competitive market structure for an effective carbon market. This market 
vs. non-market tension, intractable in economic theory, has been explored in the literature 
as a harbinger of counterproductive and excessive state intervention in China’s carbon 
market to compensate for the lack of a true market mechanism (Lo 2013) (Goron and 
Cassisa 2017).5 In addition, this tension highlights the need for China’s ongoing power 
sector reform to occur in tandem with the development of a carbon market, although the 
policy processes are effectively separate. 
Yeh and Lewis describe the contradictory logic in the management of China’s electric 
power sector, with policymakers claiming to want competition, foreign investment, and 
privatization, all while still setting prices, limiting foreign ownership, and keeping state-
owned power generation companies in the hands of small political networks (Yeh and 
Lewis 2004).  Despite attempts at textbook power sector reform, structural political and 
institutional forces in China have created this contradictory logic (Victor and Heller 
2007). The hybrid form of many sectors of China’s economy, stuck somewhere between 
market and non-market, is termed “partial reform equilibrium” by political scientist 
Victor Shih, and further attributed to the political incentives for policymakers whose 
careers stand to benefit more from an ‘inefficient’, state-controlled approach (Shih 2007). 
In addition to the scale of the policy and its link to ecological civilization, it is this 
context of so-called partial reform that drives my interest in and analysis of China’s 
carbon market.  
 
KEY INSTITUTIONS 
Starting in 2011, China established seven provincial and municipal carbon market pilots 
around the country that varied in their design elements as a step towards a national 
system (Duan, Pang, and Zhang 2014). While some of the current carbon market pilots 
auction emissions allowances and generate revenue, many pilots and the current plan for 
the national carbon market are starting with free allowance allocation, with the goal of 
eventually shifting towards auctions. This has important implications for the generation 
of revenue from the carbon market, as discussed in Chapter 3. The carbon market pilots 
have faced challenges in enforcing compliance while maintaining a robust carbon price 
                                                5	It is important to note that few if any electricity markets operate perfectly competitively – a rich empirical 
literature explores ongoing problems with firms exercising market power and monopoly even in purported 
‘market’ economies and sectors (see e.g. Kolstad and Wolak 2008, Fabra and Reguant 2013).	
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(Jotzo and Löschel 2014) (Zhang et al. 2014) (Munnings et al. 2016). While the national 
carbon market presents an opportunity to learn from the experience of the pilots and 
improve key design elements, compliance problems are unlikely to change fundamentally 
in the transition from the provincial to the federal level. According to current plans, the 
national carbon market will eventually cover eight industrial sectors representing over 
50% of China’s CO2 emissions (Goulder et al. 2017). The national carbon market was 
officially launched at the end of 2017, with the first phase focusing on capacity building. 
Actual transactions are unlikely to occur until 2020 or 2021 earliest. 
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the economic planning 
agency of the State Council of China, previously developed the design of the national 
carbon market, and was responsible for overseeing provincial and municipal carbon 
market pilots. In their seminal book on policymaking in China’s energy sector, Lieberthal 
and Oksenberg argue that Chinese bureaucratic structure is a key determinant of political 
process and outcome (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988). China’s carbon market can be 
seen as representative of this model – the ultimate form of the policy as an emissions 
trading system rather than a tax was supposedly the result of a power struggle between 
bureaucratic structures: 
 
“The struggle over the form of emissions pricing was not simply a disagreement 
about the type of approach that would be most effective; it was also a contest for 
authority over climate policy. Given the defined institutional responsibilities, the 
NDRC would clearly have domain over an ETS. In contrast, authority over a 
carbon tax would reside with the Ministry of Finance. The NDRC prevailed in this 
contest.” (Goulder et al. 2017) 
 
The NDRC further sought to consolidate its authority over the carbon market by 
restricting the use of carbon trading derivatives, which would have required some 
oversight by the Ministry of Finance, despite the theoretical importance of such products 
for the robustness of the carbon market. 
Within the NDRC, the National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International 
Cooperation (NCSC) is primarily responsible for design of the carbon market, with 
support from other sub-departments like the Energy Research Institute. The NCSC 
convened working groups to discuss policy design, staffed primarily with academics, 
industry associations, government agency representatives, and some consultants. The 
academics involved are topical experts, mostly with training in engineering and/or 
economics, from prestigious Chinese institutions like Tsinghua University. Industry 
associations are organized by sector (e.g. the China Electricity Council for the power 
sector). A limited number of financial institutions are involved in the carbon market, such 
as local carbon exchanges that facilitate transactions for the carbon market pilots. 
In early 2018, the Ministry of Environmental Protection was reorganized, renamed to the 
Ministry for Ecology and Environment (MEE), and given new responsibilities, including 
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management of the carbon market.6 This re-organization came at a critical moment for 
the national carbon market, just after its official launch but before actual carbon trading 
has started. At the time of this writing, the working group process had been suspended 
temporarily while the re-organization occurs. Some speculate that this shift in authority is 
meant to emphasize the carbon market as an environmental rather than solely economic 
policy.  
These complex dynamics should challenge researchers of China’s carbon markets to 
carefully consider what methods they use. In the next section, I lay out my multiple 
methodological approaches for analyzing China’s carbon market.   
 
ANALYZING CARBON MARKETS 
In order to assess if China’s carbon market can fulfill the ecological civilization premise 
of economic growth united with environmental protection, I began with a CGE analysis 
of economy-wide policy interactions between the carbon market and broad economic 
policy (see Chapter 3). Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are a class of 
economic models that have a rich history of use as policymaking tools. CGE models 
combine social accounting matrices of economic data in a given region and time period 
with microeconomic theory to solve numerically for supply, demand, and prices for the 
interconnected markets in that economy. The computational foundations of CGE models 
owe much to Wassily Leontief’s work on input-output accounting, the precursor to social 
accounting matrices. Leontief saw his input-output models as a critical planning tool for 
growing economies. He defined planning as “the organized application of systematic 
reasoning to the solution of specific practical problems” (Leontief 1986). Leif Johansen, 
who built upon Leontief’s input-output models by adding the ability to simulate behavior 
of individual agents, also saw his models as a large-scale planning tool for country-level 
decision-making. Johansen’s approach to CGE models allowed rapid development of 
more advanced functional forms given the relatively intuitive structure of his log-linear 
equations (Dixon et al. 2010). Separate advances in CGE modeling at the World Bank led 
to a ‘school’ of CGE models that used advances in computation to model a general 
equilibrium economy as a nonlinear system of equations, allowing precise policy analysis 
that represented a shift away from their early use as broad planning tools (Taylor 2016).  
CGE models are often criticized as ‘black boxes’ because their complex structure can 
easily obscure major assumptions, yet they are commonly used by development banks, 
applied research groups, and government agencies for policy analysis (Wing 2004). 
Various schools of CGE thought have proliferated, but the sheer scale of CGE modeling 
research warrants further investigation into their role in the policymaking process. What 
is a model? John Harte describes a model as a narrow version of a scientific theory, 
which is a broader system of knowledge (Harte 2011). Computational models can be 
thought of as simplifications of phenomena or theory into mathematical applications. 
Modeling an economic system necessarily sacrifices some information to clarify and 
condense ideas, much like a metaphor for a complex concept (Krugman 1997). For 
                                                6	Throughout Part 1, I have written agency names as they were depending on what point in time a given 
anecdote occurred.	
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academic economists, the pendulum has clearly swung towards empirical economics and 
reduced-form models in recent years (Angrist and Pischke 2010), but in the policymaking 
world, structural models like CGE are still prominent, in spite of (or perhaps because of) 
being black boxes to most policymakers. Neither method is complete as a policymaking 
tool. As such, the developers and users of models must be as up front as possible about 
how results are entirely conditional on the model chosen (Dawkins et al. 2001). 
Researchers who study models in policymaking range from cautious embrace of the 
usefulness of models, if used with some guidelines, to highly critical approaches that 
question the very premise of a model. Efforts to improve models through calibration, 
validation, sensitivity analysis, and other considerations of how to build, use, and 
communicate the results of models illustrate a faith in the ability of models to guide 
policy. At the other end of the spectrum, science historians like Naomi Oreskes argue that 
it is logically impossibly to verify or validate a model, and models are best used to 
narrowly advance critiques and hypotheses rather than to represent truth (Oreskes et al. 
1994). Other authors see models more broadly as objects of knowledge within a 
knowledge infrastructure, just one of many tools to build a social understanding of a topic 
such as climate science (Edwards 2010). The trend towards quantification and modeling 
in policymaking today can be seen as a social process, in which politicians and 
professionals turn to models to build validity and mechanical objectivity in the face of 
sociopolitical pressure for accountability (Porter 1996).  
This context about CGE models and models in policymaking more broadly is important 
for situating and critiquing my own modeling work, which uses a CGE model to analyze 
China’s carbon market. Indeed, a CGE approach is useful for examining policy 
interactions in a consistent framework, as shown in Chapter 3. During a research 
exchange in China in 2017, however, early efforts to validate my CGE analysis quickly 
revealed where the model departed from reality in the policy context of China’s carbon 
market. In particular, it quickly became clear that many types of models, including CGE 
models, would require extra work to reflect the actual context of China’s markets (i.e. 
finding a way to simulate cost pass-through mechanisms for a non-competitive power 
market), or else risk misconstruing results. This led me to turn to qualitative methods to 
examine the broader conception and use of scientific models in policymaking in China, 
which in turn led to even larger questions about the nature of policy decision-making for 
China’s carbon market (Chapter 4). Thus, the selection of these methods and frameworks 
is highly sequential, with Chapter 3 following a CGE framework to examine scenarios for 
economic growth and decarbonization, and Chapter 4 stepping outside of economics and 
using interviews and participant observation to understand how the ecological civilization 
policy of the carbon market is made.   
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CHAPTER 3: MODELING CARBON MARKETS AND 
STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC CHANGE7 
INTRODUCTION 
China’s economy has dramatically transformed since the initiation of economic reforms 
in 1978. By 2015, China had lifted more than 800 million people out of poverty and 
achieved all the Millennium Development Goals. By many metrics, however, China 
remains a developing country. GDP per capita is still 25% that of the United States 
(World Bank 2016). Sustained economic reform still underpins China’s efforts to 
transition from middle-income to high-income status. In recognition of this, central 
government strategy in China has focused on promoting structural economic transition as 
one of the most important national economic policies, one that is supported by 
ideological frameworks like ecological civilization. Structural economic transition 
emphasizes two fundamental policy adjustments: 1) increasing the contribution of 
domestic consumption to GDP relative to investment and exports; and 2) shifting the 
supply side of the economy from heavy industries to services (Qi et al. 2014). Both 
objectives are closely linked, and in this chapter I explore the relationship between post-
industrial economic transition and the national carbon market in China. The link between 
economy and environment is recognized at the highest levels in China, and is embodied 
in the concept of ecological civilization. This chapter quantitatively analyzes China’s 
national carbon market and its interaction with economic transition in China. In order to 
examine the interactive effects of the carbon market and structural economic transition, 
we examine the economy-wide effects of each policy separately and in a combined 
scenario.  
We begin by characterizing the structure of China’s economy in comparison with post-
industrial, high-income economies. China’s GDP composition is still far different from 
that of high-income countries. The relative contribution of consumption to China’s GDP 
is only half the OECD average (Figure 1), and investment is much more dominant. Two 
main reasons for China’s low consumption-to-GDP ratio are relatively low labor value 
added, which limits household income and consumption, and relatively high household 
savings rates, which also inhibit consumption but stimulate investment. Chinese 
household saving rates are among the highest in the world, a phenomenon which both 
limits consumer spending and fuels over-investment. Empirical evidence suggests that 
Chinese households devote a large portion of their income to savings as a way to self-
insure against uncertainty in quality and reliability of China’s social services, such as 
education, health care, and pensions (Cristadoro and Marconi 2012).  
 
 
                                                
7 A version of this chapter was previously published in the journal Applied Energy with co-authors Sam 
Evans, Jiang Lin, and David Roland-Holst (see Springer et al. 2019). I acknowledge these co-authors’ 
contributions and thank them for permitting me to reproduce and adapt this material as part of my 
dissertation. 
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Figure 1: Share of Consumption in GDP of OECD Countries and China, 2012  
We compared the consumption share in GDP in the year 2012, the baseline year for our model. We used 
data on GDP shares in China from our model dataset and compared it with data from the OECD.Stat 
database.  
 
Of the money that people in China spend rather than save, less of it goes to the service 
sector than in OECD countries. As consumers grow wealthier, they tend to shift marginal 
expenditure toward services and higher value-added goods. Figure 2 illustrates value-
added from services as a percentage of GDP for the OECD countries (in gray) and China 
(in red). While spending on services has increased in the past few decades, China has not 
yet reached OECD expenditure shares for services. Service sector expansion will be the 
key to China’s economic transition, as economic structure moves away from heavy 
industry and export-oriented manufacturing. In contrast to low-wage, low-skill 
manufacturing jobs, service industries encourage a diverse, productivity-based and 
compensated workforce that recycles higher income across the economy. In contrast, 
traditional investment is less skill- and job-intensive, with most value added going to 
capital rather than labor, which further restricts consumer spending. 
 
  
13 
 
 
Figure 2: Share of Value-Added from Services in GDP, OECD Countries (gray) and China (red) 
 
In this introduction, we have shown how the structure of China’s economy in terms of 
consumption, labor compensation, and value-added from services is not yet on par with 
post-industrial, high-income countries. We also introduce an important instrument – the 
household savings rate – for stimulating transition. The rest of the chapter is organized as 
follows. The literature review establishes the link between economic structure, economy-
wide energy use, and CO2 emissions, and reviews the relevant CGE-based literature. The 
methods section introduces our CGE model and modeling framework, and presents the 
scenarios in our model. Finally, we present our results and discuss them in the context of 
limitations, future work, and expansions towards a more critical lens.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although China exceeds all other countries in annual energy use and greenhouse gas 
emissions, many of China’s international pledges on climate and energy are expressed as 
intensity targets rather than absolute targets. For example, under the Paris Agreement, 
China pledged to lower the carbon intensity of GDP by 60-65% from 2005 levels. These 
intensity-based targets allow for economic growth more easily than absolute targets, as 
long as changing technology and economic the lower emissions intensity of the economy. 
Indeed, China’s economic transition towards the service sector will lead to a lower 
energy intensity economy-wide, since the service sector is generally less energy-intensive 
than heavy industry (Figure 3). China’s economic policies for structural transition will 
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thus have a huge bearing on China’s energy systems and environment. 
 
 
Figure 3: CO2 Intensity (tons CO2/10,000 yuan) of Production in China, 2012 
We used the social accounting matrix from our model and data from the China National Bureau of 
Statistics to rank each of our model’s 42 sectors by their CO2 intensity. 
 
A changing industrial structure in China can theoretically reduce CO2 emissions while 
maintaining strong economic growth (Mi et al. 2015). In doing so, the trajectory of CO2 
emissions over time in China would follow the environmental Kuznets curve, which 
hypothesizes that environmental quality (by a variety of metrics) rises and then falls as 
income increases in a given area. Empirical evidence for the environmental Kuznets 
curve has not been found for all types of environmental ills. For example, while there is 
some evidence that sulfur dioxide emissions have followed the Kuznets curve, access to 
water for household sanitation has monotonically improved as income increases (Ho and 
Wang 2014). CO2 emissions have for the most part increased within countries as they 
grow richer, especially when considering consumption-based emissions rather than 
production-based emissions, which obscure the emissions associated with imported 
products (Moran et al. 2018). Some researchers hypothesize that local pollutants like 
sulfur dioxide are more likely to follow a Kuznets curve while global pollutants like 
carbon dioxide may not (Stern 2004). There is still discussion and debate about the 
trajectory of CO2 emissions and whether or not they will reach an apex and then decline. 
Recently, China has clearly expressed targets and policy goals that would make China’s 
CO2 emissions follow a Kuznets curve in terms of absolute emissions and not just 
intensity, such as the goal of peaking their CO2 emissions by 2030. Thus, in this chapter, 
we evaluate the premise of simultaneous economic growth and decarbonization promised 
by the Kuznets curve and China’s ecological civilization ethos.  
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As discussed in Chapter 2, one of China’s main policies to promote an efficient and 
lower-emissions energy system is the national carbon market, which will likely begin 
trading in 2020 or 2021, and will follow nearly a decade of experience with pilot carbon 
markets in seven Chinese municipalities and provinces. Many studies have analyzed the 
predicted effects of China’s national carbon market on macroeconomic and 
environmental indicators such as GDP, sectoral emissions, abatement costs, and income 
(see review by Jiang et al. 2016). There is a robust literature that uses computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models of the Chinese economy to simulate the effects of a national 
carbon market (Fan et al. 2016) (Tang et al. 2016) (Li and Jia 2016). The CGE 
framework allows for convenient simulation of policy shocks relative to a baseline over 
time. CGE models can also capture complex dynamics, like income and expenditure 
effects, which are important factors in analyzing China’s economic and environmental 
policies (Qi et al. 2016). In addition, CGE models can be used to assess options for some 
aspects of the design of a carbon market. For example, prior CGE analyses of the national 
carbon market in China have found that expanding geographical and sectoral coverage of 
a national system can reduce abatement costs (Cui et al. 2014) (Mu et al. 2017) (Qian et 
al. 2018). CGE models have also been used to assess the interaction of China’s carbon 
market and different electricity pricing regimes, finding that revenue recycling can offset 
the efficiency losses from a regulated electricity market (Li et al. 2014).  
A few papers have used CGE models to analyze structural economic transition in China. 
Researchers at the World Bank, in collaboration with China’s Development Research 
Center, used a 2004 dynamic CGE model of China to analyze the idea of ‘rebalancing 
growth’ in the Chinese economy in terms of overall economic and industrial structure 
(He and Kuijs 2007). They simulate several scenarios (Table 1) for policy reforms, 
finding China can continue to grow in the long term by shifting towards services and 
through efficiency gains. These scenarios are used to illustrate the possibility of 
maintaining growth while rebalancing the economy in China. They also find that across 
scenarios, investment will still represent a relatively high share of GDP compared to 
other advanced economies. 
Several CGE modeling efforts have specifically focused on the link between economic 
transition and energy use and emissions. Feng (2016) uses an adaptation of the 
MONASH model for China using 2012 data to assess the relationship between 
rebalancing and emissions, finding that rebalancing would reduce emissions 17% by 
2030 through general equilibrium effects of reducing emissions intensity and increasing 
the price of industrial products. Qi et al. (2014) use a global CGE model to examine the 
effects of economic rebalancing on emissions associated with Chinese exports, finding 
that economic transition policies may reduce emissions domestically by shifting them 
overseas (see Chapter 5 on leakage). In order to make transparent the assumptions used to 
simulate structural economic transition, Table 1 describes how these papers implemented 
structural transition policies in a CGE framework. 
 
Table 1: Review of CGE Implementation of Structural Transition Policies 
Paper Scenario Implementation 
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He and Kuijs 
2007 “Rebalancing” 
• Shift government spending from investment to 
health, education, and social services 
• Reduce marginal propensity to save 
• Increase TFP for all sectors, and more for service 
sectors 
• Increase government revenue from health and 
education spending 
• Appreciate RMB 
• Impose energy tax 
• Remove subsidy of capital for manufacturing 
• Increase labor migration from agriculture 
• Increase rate of land transfer from agricultural to 
non-agricultural use 
He and Kuijs 
2007 
“Ambitious 
Rebalancing” 
• All of the above from “Rebalancing” 
• Increase depreciation rate of capital stock 
• Raise corporate income tax and distribute revenue 
to poor rural households 
Feng 2016 “Policy Rebalancing” 
• Increase consumption and investment shares in 
GDP 
• Shift agriculture, industry, and service sector 
shares in total value-added 
• Endogenize TFP, average propensity to consume, 
capital rate of return, and sectoral input-demand 
shifters so that the above variables can be 
exogenized 
Qi et al. 2014 “Rebalance” 
• Impose sectoral GDP contributions based on 12th 
FYP goals by applying endogenous output 
taxes/subsidies by sector 
Qi et al. 2014 “Demand” 
• The above from “Rebalance” 
• Decrease China’s trade surplus by exogenously 
decreasing capital account deficit in China and 
increasing it in other regions 
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Qi et al. 2014 “Export Tax” • Double export taxes for energy-intensive sectors 
 
METHODS 
MODELING FRAMEWORK 
To generate predictions about the carbon market policy and its interaction with structural 
transition, we use the People’s Republic of China Aggregated National Development and 
Assessment (PANDA) model, a dynamic recursive CGE model of China.8 The current 
version of PANDA is calibrated to 2012 national accounts, and can make yearly 
projections to 2050 based on assumptions of population growth, factor productivity, and 
capital formation. The model treats China as a single region that trades with a single rest-
of-world trading partner. Production is comprised of 42 different sectors, with 8 different 
electric power generation technologies (coal, natural gas, oil, nuclear, hydropower, wind, 
solar, and biomass). The 42 production sectors are described below in Table 2, using the 
meta-categories from Figure 3. PANDA is based on a balanced social accounting matrix 
(SAM), which represents the inputs and outputs of each sector and the flows between 
economic agents. We use China’s 2012 input-output table from the National Bureau of 
Statistics as the basis for our SAM (NBS 2012). Trade data is from version 8 of the 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database. Households are disaggregated into 12 
types by income level and region (rural or urban), while labor is disaggregated into two 
types, skilled and unskilled.  
 
Table 2: PANDA Sectors 
Category Sector 
Heavy Industry 
Chemicals 
Coal Mining Products 
Gas Production and Supply 
Electric Power (8 subcategories) 
Metal Mining Products 
Metal Products 
Metal Smelting and Refining 
Nonmetal Mining 
Nonmetal Products 
Oil and Gas Production 
Other Manufacturing 
Paper Production 
Refineries 
Transportation Services 
                                                
8 The PANDA model was developed in 2006 by David Roland-Holst (see Roland-Holst 2006) and has been 
modified and updated with a variety of collaborators since then.  
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Light Manufacturing 
Apparel 
Construction 
Electrical Equipment 
General Equipment 
Machine Repair 
Specialized Equipment 
Textiles 
Transportation Equipment 
Waste and Scrap 
Wood Products and Furniture 
Primary Production Agriculture, Forestry, Farming, and Fishery Products  Food and Tobacco 
Services 
Business Services 
Education 
Environmental Services 
Finance 
Healthcare 
Hotels and Restaurants 
Public Administration 
Real Estate 
Recreation and Entertainment 
Research and Technical 
Residential Services and Repairs 
Water Distribution 
Wholesale and Retail 
Tech 
Information and Communication Technology Equipment 
Information and Communication Technology Services 
Instruments and Meters 
 
The following paragraphs describe the basic structure of the PANDA general equilibrium 
model. In the production block, the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function, the 
most common non-linear function for CGE models, is used to represent the different 
substitutions across different inputs in each sector. The production structure is shown in 
Figure 4. The non-energy intermediate demand bundle is combined with a capital-energy-
labor bundle to generate the final output. The split of non-energy intermediate demand 
into intermediate demand follows the fixed proportion input-output relationship (Leontief 
function). This assumption can be considered as a special form of the CES function 
wherein the substitution elasticity is 0. The capital-energy-labor bundle is split between a 
capital-energy bundle and a labor demand bundle. In the third level, the labor demand 
bundle is split into labor demand by skill type while the capital-energy bundle is split into 
energy and capital. In the fourth level, the energy demands by fuel type are combined to 
generate energy output.  
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Figure 4: PANDA Production Block CES Nesting 
 
In the consumption block, the PANDA model includes two representative consumers, 
households and government. Household income is from labor wages, investment income, 
and transfer payments, and their income is allocated to goods and savings by an 
exogenous rate that is calibrated to the social accounting matrix. Each representative 
household is assumed to maximize utility by consuming different goods and services as 
modeled by the Linear Expenditure System (LES) specification. The government 
receives revenues from a variety of tax instruments (income, indirect, trade, and factor 
taxes), net of subsidies and transfers. Government income is allocated to goods and 
services and the aggregate expenditures are fixed in real terms.  
For international trade, the Armington assumption allows for differentiation between 
domestic products, imports, and exports. This differentiation is modeled as an aggregate, 
with one domestic Armington agent for each product category using CES and constant 
elasticity of transformation (CET) functions to represent the import and export sides, 
respectively. 
Emissions in PANDA are modeled by sector (𝐸𝐹!) as the input of different energy 
sources in each sector (𝑥𝑎𝑝!,!) multiplied by the emissions factor of the energy source 
(𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡!). Since some industries use energy inputs as feedstock rather than as fuel (such as 
the chemical industry), we correct for this proportion of energy feedstock by subtracting 
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the 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘!,! parameter (Equation 1). The total CO2 emissions of a country (EFT) 
equal the sum of emissions from the production sectors (Equation 2). 
 𝐸𝐹! =  𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡! ∗  𝑥𝑎𝑝!,! ∗ (1− 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘!,!)!      (Eq. 1) 𝐸𝐹𝑇 =  𝐸𝐹!!      (Eq. 2) 
 
SCENARIOS 
We model four scenarios: baseline (RF), a carbon market policy (ETS), structural 
transition (SR), and a carbon market and structural transition (ETS+SR). Our baseline is 
calibrated to data from the Reinventing Fire project (hence the abbreviation RF), and 
represents what is commonly known as the business-as-usual, or BAU scenario. The 
Reinventing Fire technology model was developed by China’s Energy Research Institute, 
the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory’s China Energy Group, and the Rocky 
Mountain Institute (ERI 2016). We use outputs from the Reinventing Fire technology 
model on projected annual autonomous energy efficiency improvement (AEEI), the 
projected composition of China’s electric power portfolio, and primary energy use target 
shares for key heavy industries to calibrate our baseline forecast.  
The carbon market in PANDA is simulated by making total emissions endogenous and 
subject to an exogenously imposed cap on emissions (EFcap) (Equation 3). The carbon 
price is expressed as an industry-specific tax (𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑥!,!) on carbon emissions by 
multiplying the cap-induced shadow carbon price in RMB/ton (𝜇) by the sector-specific 
emissions factor (Equation 4). The revenue from the emissions trading system (ETSR) 
comes from the emissions permits purchased by the production sector, simulated in 
Equation 5. 
 𝐸𝐹𝑐𝑎𝑝 ≤  𝐸𝐹𝑇     (Eq. 3) 𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑥!,! =  𝜇 ∗  𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡!,!     (Eq. 4) 𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑅 =  𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑥!,!! ∗  𝑥𝑎𝑝!,!!      (Eq. 5) 
 
The carbon tax is applied to production sectors (𝑥𝑎𝑝!,!) by being inserted into PANDA’s 
constant-elasticity-of-substitution production function equations. As currently set up in 
PANDA, allowances are assumed to be fully auctioned, and the revenue is collected by 
the government and recycled to households as a lump-sum transfer. China’s national 
carbon market will first cover the power sector, and phase in at least seven other sectors 
over time; in our model, we apply the cap to all production sectors. The carbon market 
policy begins in 2020, matching the expected start date for the national carbon market in 
China. For the cap, we specify a 20% reduction in economy-wide emissions below 
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baseline by 2030 and a 30% reduction by 2050, with the annual cap scaling linearly 
between these targets each year. We selected these targets based on rough calculation of 
the emissions that will be mitigated, in percentage reduction terms, from the current draft 
power sector benchmarking plan for the national carbon market, which we assumed could 
be scaled and applied to other sectors by 2030, and increased in stringency by 2050. We 
believe our implementation of the carbon market in the PANDA models represents a 
medium- to long-term vision of China’s carbon market as an ambitious economy-wide 
instrument in competitive markets, and one that drives much of the mitigation over this 
period. 
The structural transition in PANDA is simulated by linearly reducing the household 
savings rate each year. This is meant to address the common notion among 
macroeconomists that the overall household savings rate in China is relatively high, 
which dampens consumption and leads to overinvestment in capital, slowing the 
progression of the economy towards an OECD-like composition (see Introduction). We 
simulate structural transition via reduced savings rate alone (SR), and alongside the 
carbon market (ETS+SR). The ETS and structural transition scenarios are designed to 
simulate increased consumer spending in low carbon intensity sectors. 
 
RESULTS 
We find that it should be feasible for China to reconcile its aggregate growth and 
environmental goals, sustaining higher GDP per capita and lowering emissions, while 
shifting the structure of its economy. By 2040, we find that the structural transition 
scenarios (ETS+SR and SR) both have a GDP growth rate of 2.1% per year, which is 
slightly lower than the assumed baseline growth rate of 2.3% per year by 2040. The ETS 
scenario slightly increases GDP level due to the consumption-boosting effect of the 
recycled revenue from the carbon market (Figure 5). Thus, in the combined scenario, 
ETS+SR, the carbon market helps mitigate the dampening effects of structural transition 
on GDP growth. Naturally, these results rest on the validity of our assumptions related to 
carbon market policy design (namely, that revenue is generated through auctions) and the 
impact of allowance redistribution (lump-sum transfers). While China doesn’t use an 
auction mechanism currently, policymakers have expressed the goal of moving in that 
direction, as well as using revenue recycling to achieve various policy aims.  
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Figure 5: China’s Real GDP at Market Prices by Scenario, 2012-2050 
 
While the GDP trajectories for each scenario show only slight deviations by 2050, the 
composition of GDP drastically shifts by 2050 in the structural transition scenarios, 
demonstrating that the savings rate instrument is a highly effective lever for structural 
transition. Figure 6 shows that our implementation of structural transition in PANDA 
achieves OECD-like GDP composition shares by 2050, with consumption increasing as a 
share of GDP and investment decreasing.  
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Figure 6: Components of GDP by PANDA Scenario in China, 2050 
 
Increasing consumption drives growth in GDP in the structural transition scenarios. 
Without adjusting the savings rate, both the baseline and ETS-only policies show modest 
growth in each of the GDP components, while overall growth in the structural transition 
scenarios is driven by an increase in consumption that offsets a decrease in investment. 
The ETS+SR scenario has the greatest increase in consumption share, demonstrating the 
interacting effects of the policies, with the carbon market further stimulating consumption 
via revenue recycled to households. The percent change from the baseline scenario in 
2050 is shown for each GDP component in Table 3 below. 
Table 3: Effect of Policy Scenarios on GDP Components (% Change from Baseline) in 2050 
GDP Component ETS ETS+SR SR 
Government Spending +1.1% -1.6% -2.5% 
Investment +5.9% -31.2% -33.9% 
Consumption +3.6% +13.8% +10.9% 
Exports +2.1% -13.2% -14.5% 
Imports -0.4% -17.4% -17.4% 
Total Real GDP +3.8% -4.1% -6.4% 
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As laid out in the Introduction, structural economic transition refers to changes in both 
GDP composition and industrial structure. Our model demonstrates that a lowered 
household savings rate will shift GDP composition towards an OECD-like structure by 
2050. At the same time, this transition will also move the industrial structure away from 
heavy industry and towards services (Table 4). Production in the service sector increases 
across all scenarios, with the greatest increase coming from the ETS+SR scenario. This 
shift towards services is driven by increased overall consumer spending combined with 
heavier regulation of more emissions-intensive sectors, sending consumers towards lower 
emissions-intensity sectors, namely services.  
 
Table 4: Effect of Policy Scenarios on Sector Production (% Change from Baseline) in 2050 
Sector ETS ETS+SR SR 
Primary Production +1.5% -16.3% -17.2% 
Heavy Industry -5.7& -20.8% -18.4% 
Light Manufacturing +3.2% -26.1% -27.7% 
Services +1.9% +7.6% +6.1% 
Tech +2.1% -9.3% -10.7% 
 
Our model baseline indicates that CO2 emissions in China will peak in 2030, which is in 
line with China’s climate targets. With a carbon market, we find that China’s emissions 
peak earlier (in 2025) and at a lower level (Figure 7). The ETS and ETS+SR scenarios 
both reduce emissions the same amount, that is, the amount specified by the emissions 
cap. In other words, the emissions cap is the binding constraint even when structural 
transition is taken into account. The SR scenario alone reduces emissions by 16% relative 
to baseline due to the shifting structure of the economy away from heavy industry and 
towards services. This is more than half of the reductions achieved by the carbon market 
alone, a finding similar to results from Feng (2016). 
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Figure 7: Annual CO2 Emissions in China by Scenario (Gt CO2), 2012-2050 
 
It is important to note that the ETS emissions reductions are achieved at significantly 
different mitigation costs for regulated firms based on the scenario. Emissions reductions 
are achieved at a much lower carbon price when the structural transition scenario 
interacts with the ETS, compared to the ETS alone (Figure 8). As shown in Table 4, the 
structural transition scenario shifts the economy towards less emissions-intensive service 
sectors, leading to complementary emissions reductions.9 In 2030, the ETS alone induces 
a carbon price of 96 RMB/ton, while the ETS+SR scenario has a carbon price of 64 
RMB/ton the same year. In 2050, the ETS-only carbon price rises to 343 RMB/ton, while 
the ETS+SR carbon price is less than half this, at 165 RMB/ton. The ETS and SR policy 
scenarios are complementary and work toward consistent purposes. 
                                                
9 For a discussion of potential emissions leakage, see Chapter 5 and the concluding chapter 
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Figure 8: ETS Carbon Price by Scenario (RMB/ton CO2), 2012-2050 
Note: The RF and SR scenarios do not have a carbon pricing structure 
 
DISCUSSION 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This study provides a CGE-based assessment of China's carbon market and its interaction 
with structural economic transition. Although we consider detailed economic structure 
and complex linkages between policy, emissions, and industrial structure, there remain 
important limitations that need to be addressed in future work. Firstly, in this study, the 
carbon market is centralized and simplified. Without auctions, the carbon market will not 
directly generate revenue. Our results assume that China’s national carbon market will 
eventually use an auction mechanism, which some of the pilots are currently 
experimenting with. The allowance allocation mechanism for the power sector at the 
national level is still under consideration at the time of the writing. Secondly, although 
we model an economy-wide carbon market, the national carbon market in China will first 
cover the power sector, and it is still uncertain when coverage will be expanded to other 
industries. As indicated by current plans, the national carbon market will eventually cover 
8 sectors representing over 50% of China’s emissions. The estimated revenue from our 
model is proportional to the emissions covered by our assumed carbon market policy 
design. Thus, our results represent a maximum estimate for the amount of revenue that 
can be generated from a national carbon market in China that auctions allowances and 
has economy-wide coverage. In addition, it is important to note that China’s power sector 
is still highly regulated. Even though policy innovations can help integrate a carbon price 
into China’s power markets, there will be massive efficiency gains from restructuring the 
power markets alone, and a more competitive wholesale electricity market is critical to 
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passing on the price signal of a carbon market (Lin et al. 2018) (Teng et al. 2017). 
Therefore, to make the study more consistent with the current carbon market situation, 
the carbon market can be calibrated more precisely to present conditions, as in Li et al. 
2014 or Li et al. 2018, for example.  
Finally, we use a single policy instrument – the household savings rate – to simulate 
economic transition. We assume a single savings rate across different household types, 
but future modeling exercises could allow for more detailed and accurate representation 
of household savings rates using econometric estimates from the literature. In addition, 
economic transition policies beyond the savings rate could be elaborated to more fully 
reflect China’s long-term goals. This paper shows that carbon market and economic 
transition policies offer an extensive spectrum of opportunities to advance economic and 
social objectives, but precise and optimal characteristics of these policies need to be 
supported by further analysis.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
China’s national carbon market and structural economic transition policies will both 
significantly affect the energy and emissions intensity of China’s economy. Prior 
literature has explored the interaction of complementary policies with a carbon market; 
however, the even larger link between emissions and basic economic structure has been 
underexplored. In this paper, we use a CGE framework to explicitly model the 
interactions between structural economic transition and a national carbon market. Our 
findings have implications for the design of the national carbon market. We find that 
when structural economic transition is taken into account, mitigation costs for firms from 
a national carbon market will be significantly lower. To maintain a robust carbon price, 
policymakers should consider this effect when determining carbon market design 
features. 
From within a CGE framework, this research provides a quantitative proof of concept for 
ecological civilization policies – that economic growth can occur even as environmental 
ills are reduced. In the scenarios we model, long-term growth is maintained even as CO2 
emissions decrease. While the GDP growth rate is slightly lower in the structural 
transition scenarios, the composition of the economy dramatically shifts towards a more 
OECD-like structure, with low emission-intensity service sectors showing the most 
growth. This shift matches the increasing emphasis Chinese leaders are placing on quality 
rather than speed of growth. It is a demonstration of the theorized composition effect of 
GDP growth on the environment – a change in the structure of economic activity towards 
cleaner sectors. In addition, we find that a carbon market with revenue recycling to 
households helps to mitigate the GDP-dampening effects of structural transition by 
stimulating consumption. These results can be useful to other energy and economic 
modelers considering how to incorporate consideration of structural economic transition 
in their research, as well as to policymakers looking for guiding theory on how emissions 
policies will interact with a transitioning economy.  
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Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said in 2013, “We should unswervingly take 
expanding domestic demand as our long-term strategy for economic development,” and 
the current Chinese leadership clearly recognizes the need to stimulate consumption (Yao 
and Wang 2013). In this paper, we demonstrate that a lower household savings rate 
significantly stimulates consumption and drives economic transition, shifting the 
structure of China’s economy in terms of consumption, labor compensation, and value-
added from services to a structure that is more similar to post-industrial, high-income 
countries. The Chinese government should encourage a lower household savings rate in 
order to capture the economic and environmental benefits of structural transition. In 
addition to the high-level strategic commitment to increasing consumption, China must 
also invest in social policies that improve public education, healthcare, and pensions, 
which will encourage consumers to spend more by freeing them from the need to self-
insure. However, social and environmental policies need not be considered separate. Our 
research indicates that policies that support structural economic transition will also 
reduce emissions and lower the cost of environmental regulations like a national carbon 
market. 
 
TOWARDS A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
Our analysis sheds light on broad potential mechanisms of interaction between a carbon 
market and structural economic transition. However, this analysis also rests on deep 
methodological assumptions. CGE models and indeed the economic theory of carbon 
markets abstract the process of transforming material emissions into a commodity, 
assuming this process is perfect and frictionless. Most CGE modeling exercises assume a 
competitive power market structure, although this is not the case in China, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Incremental improvements in modeling China’s power market can be made, 
and policy innovations can occur to get around the cost pass-through issue. However, 
fundamental discrepancies between the economic theory of many models and the reality 
of China’s power market structure remain.  
In order to establish an emissions trading system, pollution must be transformed into a 
commodity - first envisioned as a measurable unit, then embedded within a legal and 
regulatory structure that allows universal exchange. Industry groups, academics, and 
other stakeholders advocate for standardized carbon markets around the world. One 
stated mission of the International Emissions Trading Association is to “establish 
effective market-based trading systems for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that are fair, 
open, efficient, accountable and consistent across national boundaries” (emphasis my 
own) (IETA 2018). This universal model of a carbon market is being promoted in many 
places. Many carbon market advocates believe that eventual linkage of carbon markets 
and a single carbon price would be the most economically efficient system. Although 
carbon markets are typically implemented at the national or subnational level, they are 
increasingly linked across jurisdictions. These linkages are not only direct, such as the 
linkage of the California and Quebec carbon markets, plus many other proposed linkages 
(Ranson and Stavins 2016), but there are also intangible linkages in terms of the network 
of institutions and people who trade expertise across carbon markets. The regulatory 
regime of carbon markets is a complex network of actors from academia, NGOs, the 
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private sector, etc. who trade research, data, know-how, and mental/computational 
models of how to manage carbon markets. In addition, the physical aspects of carbon 
markets are increasingly globalized from the bottom up. Regulated entities (such as 
power plants) receive cross-border capital and technology, while the technologies for 
implementing carbon markets, such as monitoring software and tools, are also traded 
across borders. In this way, carbon markets are, to an extent, defined by infrastructural 
globalism – they are “projects for permanent, unified, world-scale institutional-
technological complexes that generate globalist information” (Edwards 2010).  
The establishment of a carbon market deliberately removes local context by treating 
carbon dioxide emissions reductions as a uniformly tradable good. Doing so “abstracts 
from where, how, when and by whom the [emissions] cuts are made, disembedding 
climate solutions from history and technology and re-embedding them in neoclassical 
economic theory, trade treaties, property law, risk management,” and other global 
thought paradigms (Lohmann 2009). According to environmental and economic theory, a 
ton of carbon dioxide has the same environmental impact no matter where it is emitted, 
which sets it apart from other emissions such as air pollutants. This theory represents 
what Michael Hulme calls “the view from everywhere”, a globalized knowledge that 
‘erases geographical and cultural difference and in which scale collapses to the global’ 
(Hulme 2010). In the next chapter, I seek to understand how this transformation of carbon 
dioxide molecules into emissions allowances actually occurs, and how it is shaped by 
local context in China - a local context that is often overlooked in quantitative analyses of 
China’s carbon market.   
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CHAPTER 4: BECOMING A CARBON MARKET: DATA, 
EXPERTISE, AND CAPACITY BUILDING 
INTRODUCTION 
WAITING FOR THE MARKET 
This chapter advances two main ideas. First, I argue that the national carbon market in 
China is a highly productive policy market even though it has yet to deliver its policy 
goals. Second, I argue that this productivity arises from attempts to standardize carbon 
management. Challenges in doing so have been previously portrayed as evidence of 
governance failure amidst irreconcilable state vs. market tension. In this section, I 
introduce the first idea – that the national carbon market is productive in its perceived 
state of delay and downsizing.  
The proliferation of carbon markets around the world waxes and wanes with political 
tides. Some carbon markets have struggled to maintain high and stable carbon prices. Yet 
since the announcement of the policy in China, China’s national policymakers have 
unswervingly supported and promoted the pilot and national carbon markets, even as 
conceptual and operational challenges have arisen. Despite these challenges, the carbon 
market is a productive locus of political and economic opportunity as a policy in the 
making. 
China’s national carbon market was originally supposed to begin in 2017, according to 
earlier high-profile and high-level statements, such as the U.S.-China Joint Presidential 
Statement on Climate Change between Obama and Xi in 2015: “China also plans to start 
in 2017 its national emission trading system, covering key industry sectors such as iron 
and steel, power generation, chemicals, building materials, paper-making, and nonferrous 
metals” (White House 2015). Several factors contribute to what many call a delay: lack 
of reliable emissions accounts (Platts 2018), excessive state intervention, and the NDRC-
to-MEE transfer of responsibility. Although the national carbon market was officially 
launched at the end of 2017, no actual trading activity occurred at the national level as 
had been anticipated. The launch of the carbon market was instead divided into phases, 
with the first phase focusing on foundation building (基础建设期). Actual transactions 
are unlikely to occur until 2020 or 2021 earliest. 
In addition to a shifting timeline for the onset of actual carbon trading at the national 
level, there has also been a narrowing of scope of the policy. The number of sectors that 
an emissions trading system covers plays a large role in the overall cost of mitigating the 
cost of those emissions, and is thus an important design element for the national carbon 
market (Mu et al. 2017). However, the proposed sectors to be covered by China’s 
national carbon market have been successively reduced since the initial draft plan by the 
NDRC in January 2016. Earlier policy documents suggested that China’s carbon market 
was going to cover 14 sectors. The January 2016 NDRC draft plan for the national carbon 
market proposed covering 8 sectors: electricity, chemicals, iron and steel, cement, 
metallurgy, papermaking, aviation, and building materials. The May 2017 draft plan 
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proposed covering just 3 sectors: electricity, cement, and metallurgy. As of now, the 
national carbon market will only cover one sector, the electric power sector. Other sectors 
are meant to be eventually phased in, but the stated ambition has significantly changed.  
After the Obama-Xi statement in 2015 and the Paris Agreement in 2016, “everyone was 
filled with hope and brilliant expectations” for China’s carbon market, as one consultant 
put it. Now, because of the perceived delays in setting up the national carbon market, 
some people have left China’s carbon market industry. Nevertheless, state investment and 
political commitment are expanding, even as the scope of the policy has narrowed, the 
timeline has shifted, some players have exited the field, and global enthusiasm for carbon 
markets wavers. China is now the beacon of hope for carbon market supporters around 
the world.  
This chapter is a story of becoming. It is not a glowing endorsement of the savior carbon 
market, nor a bleak picture of things inevitably failing because of China’s poor data 
quality, inefficient bureaucracy, and incomplete marketization, as much of the literature 
and media have portrayed the story. In the midst of so-called delay and downsizing, many 
productive things are occurring. The process of becoming and waiting for the carbon 
market has itself transformed into a market, as national policymakers legitimize and 
promote standardization and capacity building. In the carbon market’s state of perceived 
delay, capacity building keeps optimism alive by focusing on the aspirational future that 
is yet to come. Policymakers adjust policies when difficulties arise, regulated firms adapt 
to regulation (上有政策，下有对策), and consultancies find opportunities within this 
dance. Policies like the carbon market can take decades to become functional, making it 
difficult to ascribe success or failure when the market is very much still in a state of 
becoming. 
 
FROM MARKETIZATION TO STANDARDIZATION 
In this section, I introduce my framing of the process of developing a national carbon 
market in China not simply as marketization, but more so as a standardization process 
that solidifies top-down power and knowledge structures. In the broader political 
economy literature, markets are increasingly being recognized as embedded institutions 
sustained by extensive government intervention (Vogel 2018), rather than self-assembled 
entities guided by an ‘invisible hand’ that aligns supply and demand. However, the 
qualitative literature on China’s carbon market focuses primarily on factors – whether 
political, economic, or otherwise – related to the carbon market’s ascribed success or 
failure as a traditional economic policy instrument seeking cost-effective reduction of 
carbon dioxide emissions. Lo (2016) explores the political economic context of China’s 
carbon market, highlighting incomplete regulatory infrastructure and excessive 
government intervention as major challenges to a “finance-led” carbon market. Lo and 
Howes (2013) thoroughly investigate the nature of state intervention in China’s pilot 
carbon markets, again characterizing China’s carbon market as a deviation from a 
neoliberal norm (Lo and Howes 2013). Goron and Cassisa (2017) define a “paradox” for 
China’s carbon market:  
 
32 
 
“What consequences can be teased out from [the pilot carbon markets] regarding 
whether China’s ETS can serve the goals of global climate change governance? A 
preliminary step is to recognize a paradox in China’s ETS policy-making. On the 
one hand, it is perceived to rest on the power of the state rather than the market. 
On the other hand, [the carbon market] is also expected to reform China’s 
‘command-and-control’ environmental governance system.” (Goron and Cassisa 
2017) 
The authors then investigate on the role of local regulatory institutions in shaping the 
operation of the pilot carbon markets in China, juxtaposing local governments with the 
ability to achieve globally acceptable “climate change governance”. This assertion of 
“paradox” for market-based environmental policy in China was solidified over a decade 
ago in Tao and Mah’s 2009 paper on governance “dilemmas” in China’s sulfur dioxide 
emissions trading system (which is analogous in structure to the carbon market). Tao and 
Mah identify four “dilemmas” of governance in China that affect market-based 
environmental policies like the sulfur dioxide market: state control vs. market 
competition, welfare provider vs. market regulator, centralization vs. decentralization of 
environmental responsibility, and vertical control vs. horizontal coordination of actors 
(Tao and Mah 2009).  This language of tension, dilemma, and paradox characterizes 
much of the political economic literature on China’s carbon market.  
Such framings fix the carbon market as a policy instrument, one that can be analyzed 
from many frameworks, but primarily for its success or failure in reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions according to global norms. However, few studies focus on the carbon market 
as a process. This chapter examines the process of creating the carbon market, while also 
seeking a more capacious representation of China’s carbon market. I deliberately move 
outside the equilibrium/disequilibrium framework of Chapter 3 to tell the story of how 
China’s carbon market has been created not necessarily in tension with a more ideal form 
of market, but as a particular translation process of the global, neoliberal logic of carbon 
markets to a Chinese context. The carbon market is but a microcosm of China’s state-
guided market liberalization, wherein the Chinese government uses neoliberal logic to 
serve its own interests. Thus, this chapter speaks to the nature of neoliberalism in China, 
which is often portrayed as being a non-market, socialist market, or marketizing 
economy. I frame the process of developing a national carbon market in China not as 
‘marketization’ – imposing a market structure on a previously non-market system – but 
rather as a standardization process that solidifies top-down power and knowledge 
structures.  
China has a long and rich history of using standardization to inform its policymaking 
through ‘state simplification’, rationalizing social processes into administratively 
convenient formats for governments. By the 4th century BC, the Qin dynasty (China’s 
first dynasty) imposed surnames among commoners who previously lacked them, which 
allowed enumeration for taxes, forced labor, and so on, to be passed on through the 
generations patrilineally. The term for ‘commoner’ in Chinese, 老百姓, or ‘old one 
hundred names’, may have originated from this initiative (Scott 1998). In more modern 
Chinese history, Tong Lam traces the rise of social surveys and a ‘culture of fact’ in the 
early 1900s as a key part of the nascent Chinese state’s modernizing and civilizing 
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initiatives. These social surveys, built on Western models, also helped legitimize 
managerial social science across the country and contributed to “the honing of the arts of 
governance of the emerging nation-state” (Lam 2013). Arunabh Ghosh explores the link 
between the institutionalization and practice of statistics in the first decade of the 
People’s Republic of China and the ideologies of its leaders (Ghosh 2014), when the need 
to carry out national economic planning required the establishment of statistical and 
economic capacities. In the 1950s, Chinese planners and policymakers adopted Soviet 
analytical techniques of input-output accounting and material balance planning, (Riskin 
1987), which specifies output targets for producers and a supply plan for allocating 
resources among them. 
This chapter opens up avenues of inquiry into practices of standardization for 
policymaking of China’s national carbon market, connecting these practices to neoliberal 
visions of carbon markets. I hypothesize that capacity-building processes attempt to 
smooth the unruly, politicized landscape by bringing a globalized and standardized 
approach to carbon management. In this chapter, I show how the process of creating the 
market is characterized by a mediation of the heterogeneity of actors in this space and the 
homogenizing attempts of capacity building to create a carbon market standardized to 
global and Chinese state norms. The national carbon market, as one of China’s most 
prominent climate, energy, and environmental policies, and one that is also deeply 
connected to economic reform, translates a globalized neoliberal vision of carbon markets 
into a Chinese ecological civilization policy (see Chapter 1). To put it another way, the 
neoliberal logic of carbon markets, upon arrival in China, has been transformed so as to 
meet the interests of the many actors involved. My research aims to delineate this local 
formation and expression of China’s national carbon market. 
In 2017 and 2018, I conducted interviews of stakeholders in China’s national carbon 
market from Chinese universities, the private sector, the national Chinese government, 
and Chinese civil society primarily in Beijing, but also in several pilot carbon market 
jurisdictions. These interviewees were identified through snowball sampling of my 
networks. I began my snowball sampling with computer modelers, because I found that 
our shared skillset enabled ease of conversation, and these people often had hands-on 
experience working with data relevant for the carbon market design process. Interviews 
were semi-structured and conducted in English, Chinese, or both languages, depending 
on the subject’s preference. I also conducted participant observation at publically 
accessible events relevant to the carbon market. I took extensive field notes, inspired by 
‘classic ethnography’ approaches (Adler and Adler 2008) that allow researchers to tease 
out mechanistic processes. I coded and analyzed my data drawing from an exploratory, 
iterative grounded theory approach. This research is CPHS/IRB approved. Names and 
identifying information are changed throughout the chapter. 
The first step in establishing a carbon market is collecting information about the 
enterprises to be regulated. In the first section of this chapter, I lay out the emissions 
‘datascape’, which encompasses the actors, processes, and information that form China’s 
CO2 emissions accounting systems. I characterize the great variation in data quantity and 
quality, and the ways in which different actors are affecting this variation. In the second 
section, I show how data are used to inform decisions about the design of the national 
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carbon market, and in particular how expertise and authority are generated through data 
access and modeling tools. Finally, I discuss the entire capacity building machine that 
sustains China’s carbon market, showing how the engine of capacity building is 
promulgated by carbon market policymakers to make the carbon market economically 
productive in lieu of actual carbon trading. 
 
THE EMISSIONS DATASCAPE: BUILDING EMISSIONS MONITORING, REPORTING, 
AND VERIFICATION SYSTEMS 
According to economic theory, markets rely on information. Transparent information 
allows market participants to settle on efficient prices. Global climate policy often 
operates in the economic framework of maximizing emissions reductions while 
minimizing costs. Greenhouse gas emissions accounting is thus a fundamental part of the 
global climate policy regime – specifically, trustworthy accounting of emissions at the 
national and subnational levels to enable policy formulation and evaluation. The 
UNFCCC has called for regular, accurate, and transparent emissions accounting at the 
country level in order to set national emissions reduction targets (INDCs) and assess 
progress towards these targets. For more than a decade, groups like the IPCC and the 
World Resources Institute have promulgated greenhouse gas accounting protocols to help 
companies, countries, and other institutions around the world establish standardized 
emissions accounting processes. Many countries have gone on to adopt mandatory 
emissions reporting systems with varying degrees of granularity and accuracy. 
China has faced past challenges in energy and emissions reporting. In 2015, the National 
Bureau of Statistics was accused of underreporting coal consumption by around 17% 
(Buckley 2015). In 2012, an international team of researchers from China, the UK, and 
the U.S. found a massive discrepancy between national and provincial datasets on energy 
use in China, which form the basis for estimating carbon dioxide emissions (Guan et al. 
2012). China’s National Bureau of Statistics annually publishes national and provincial 
Energy Balance Sheets, which report energy inventories and final energy consumption 
data that can be used to calculate carbon dioxide emissions. The national-level emissions, 
which should have been equal to the sum of the provincial data, were in fact 20% lower 
in the 2010 inventory. This discrepancy amounted to 1.4 gigatons of carbon dioxide, or 
5% of the world’s total emissions that year. The researchers identified this discrepancy as 
stemming from small coal producers that only reported to provincial authorities, as well 
as systematic under-reporting from provincial to national authorities. In light of this 
discrepancy, the national government recently updated historical statistics on coal use, a 
significant upwards revision (Zhang et al. 2019).  
In the UNFCCC negotiations as well as other venues, there has been marked criticism of 
China for the low quality and availability of its emissions data. The growing international 
consensus on emissions accounting is well understood by the NDRC and now the MEE, 
which recently took over greenhouse gas emissions-related responsibilities from the 
NDRC. For carbon markets, the most essential data for regulation are firm-level carbon 
dioxide emissions, which must be monitored, reported, and verified (MRV) each year as 
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part of the regulatory process. Emissions accounting and MRV allows policymakers to 
track progress, enforce the regulation, and determine the size of the market (i.e. how 
many allowances will be traded). As one of Michael Bloomberg’s favorite sayings goes, 
“If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it.” 
Given the shifting timeline and scope of the national carbon market, policymakers have 
made it clear that more complete and accurate emissions inventories from regulated 
sectors are needed in order to design key features and expand the scope of the national 
carbon market. Thus, many capacity building efforts in China focus on enabling firms 
and their regulators to complete the MRV process. As with the broader, globalized 
concept of a carbon market, China’s approach to emissions accounting as the foundation 
of its carbon market has also taken on local forms. This section describes the process of 
transforming physical emissions from an industrial plant in China into a commodified 
carbon allowance that can be traded in China’s carbon market(s). This process of making 
emissions commensurable is a momentous task across the heterogeneity of China’s 
industrial landscape – creating carbon allowances that someday will allow a Zhejiang 
steel plant to pay a coal plant in Xinjiang to emit one less ton of carbon. I focus 
specifically on the role of data, showing how the emissions accounting process for 
China’s carbon market sometimes enables, sometimes stymies standardization. The goal 
of this section is to lay out the ‘datascape’ that underlies China’s national carbon market. 
In this framing, I draw from Ingmar Lippert’s discussion of the environment as a 
materially, semiotically shaped datascape that joins carbon dioxide molecules to the 
carbon economy as produced by those doing the emissions accounting (Lippert 2015). 
Here, I conceptualize the datascape as a living landscape of emissions information, 
including the actors and processes that create and manage that information, and describe 
the datascape of China’s carbon market, from emissions accounting to MRV.  
 
A TALE OF TWO COAL PLANTS 
The threshold for a power plant’s inclusion in the national carbon market is emitting 
more than 26,000 tons of greenhouse gases (CO2e) or consuming more than 10,000 tons 
of coal equivalent (tce) per year. This applies to electricity generating industries (发电行
业), enterprises (企业), and economic organizations (经济组织), as well as other sectors 
with electric power plants on-site (其他行业自备电厂) (NDRC 2017). About 1,700 
power plants nationwide are above this threshold and will be covered by the national 
carbon market (Timperley 2018). For now, this means that they are required to submit 
data on their emissions to their provincial or municipal governments, which then validate 
and report this information to the national authorities. Two separate third-party verifiers, 
as organized by the provincial or municipal governments, audit the emissions data for 
each plant. 
Although the power sector is the first sector being covered by the national carbon market, 
China has collected annual emissions data from some to-be regulated sectors for several 
years. In the past, emissions data were unreliable, and energy and emissions data didn’t 
match (as the previously discussed “gigaton gap” report found), so the ongoing process of 
collecting this data is meant to establish a correct baseline for the carbon market. In 2012, 
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the NDRC first published guidelines for enterprises to account for and report their 
emissions, which were used to collect data from enterprises in 24 industrial sectors across 
China in 2013, 2014, and 2015. These basic guidelines were further clarified and 
expanded in the NDRC’s 2014 “Interim Measures on the Administration of Carbon 
Emissions Trading” for MRV, and a further notice in 2016 that had more detailed 
reporting and verification requirements for the already-collected data from 2013 to 2015. 
These later policies required enterprises to come up with an emissions monitoring plan to 
be approved by local officials, which is meant to guide the annual reporting process. In 
2016, provincial and municipal governments began to verify the 2013-2015 emissions 
accounts. Together these documents form the legal framework for the national carbon 
market and lay out the basic MRV requirements, although there is concern about lack of 
clarity in some of the calculations and requirements, as well as lack of legal force (Tang 
et al. 2018).  
The following tale of two power plants illustrates, hypothetically, the potentially vast 
differences in the process of establishing emissions inventories. First, we visit a natural 
gas plant in Beijing. This plant is one of the few thermal power plants still inside the city 
of Beijing – air pollution regulations have driven most of these plants outside the city 
limits or out of business. With its landscaped lawn and gleaming lobby filled with light-
up models of the power plant’s technology, the plant is frequently visited by students on 
field trips. The plant is owned by one of the five major state-owned power generation 
companies in China, a conglomerate like Shenhua or Huaneng. Ten years ago, the parent 
company participated in an international carbon market called the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), selling carbon offsets from some of its low-carbon power generation 
projects to companies in Europe. Around six years ago when the national emissions 
accounting guidelines were established and Beijing’s pilot carbon market started, the 
company’s CDM team reassembled and quickly designed an emissions reporting protocol 
for the plants that were to be regulated by the pilot carbon market. They gathered 
production data from across their subsidiaries, including the plant in Beijing, and 
established an electronic system for annual reporting. They report this plant’s data to the 
Beijing DRC, which collects annual emissions data from all facilities within Beijing 
covered by the pilot carbon market. It took some time for the parent company and the 
DRC to establish a regular, clear reporting process, but they’ve already had 6 years of 
practice. 
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Figure 9: Educational diorama and study tour, Taiyanggong natural gas power plant, Beijing (photo 
from October 2018, author’s own) 
 
Now consider a coal plant in Inner Mongolia. Isolated on the fringes of small city 
Xilinhot, the plant is above the threshold for inclusion in the national carbon market, but 
had never accounted for or reported its emissions before the NDRC guidelines were 
released. The plant managers kept track of their fuel purchases and reported their energy 
data to local officials, but had never worked with the emissions staff at the Inner 
Mongolia DRC before. Their parent company is a local generation company with several 
plants. The parent company manages to report the plant’s emissions the first year that it is 
required, but the next year they hire a consultant that they heard about from their industry 
group. The consultant helps them prepare a better report for the next year, leading to 
large discrepancies from the previous year. Later, their emissions reports are verified by 
two separate third-party verifiers, per NDRC’s newest guidelines. These third-party 
verifiers arrive in teams at the parent company’s offices in Ulaanbaatar and cross-check 
production data and financial data for the plant under review. These third-party verifiers 
are new companies recently created to take advantage of the sudden and massive need for 
emissions verification services. It is their first field trip to the province, and the two firms 
produce different estimates of the Xilinhot plant’s emissions for the verification reports.  
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Figure 10: Coal plant in Inner Mongolia (September 2018, photo credit: Xi Wang) 
 
For the Inner Mongolia plant, multiple ‘data points’ are collected for a single firm’s 
emissions, all of which are a function of the experience, expertise, and processes 
conducted by several separate entities, making the actual quality of the data unclear. For 
the Beijing plant, emissions estimates eventually collapse into a predictable pattern as the 
local government and the parent company navigate new reporting requirements over a 
period of years. In fact, once the NDRC’s 2016 guidelines were announced, Inner 
Mongolia and Xinjiang had to re-report and verify their 2013-2015 emissions accounts 
due to poor data quality and even missing information (Tang et al. 2018). These regional 
disparities in data quality are further explored in the next section.  
Although two verification bodies are required to independently check emissions reporting 
for each plant, it is not uncommon for these estimates to diverge. The massive 
heterogeneity in location, experience, company structure, and so on create major 
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challenges in generating a single, “accurate” emissions estimate for each regulated plant. 
“Making things the same” for the construction of emissions inventories is no small feat, 
including making different types of greenhouse gases commensurable (MacKenzie 2009). 
This heterogeneity – the multiple estimates of a single firm’s emissions – is deliberately 
obscured by the compliance cycle set up by the NDRC. The compliance cycle is 
summarized in Figure 11 below, from a PowerPoint presentation by an official from the 
carbon markets team at the NDRC (Shuang n.d.).   
 
 
Figure 11: Emissions Reporting Compliance Cycle Schematic  
 
Compliance refers to covered entities following the prior steps on time (i.e., submitting 
monitoring plans, emissions reports, and verification reports). For covered entities 
actively engaging in carbon trading (that is, those in the pilot carbon markets), each 
firm’s allocated carbon allowances must also match its emissions. Thus far, the 
compliance rate (i.e., percent of firms that have complied) is the only metric used to 
assess the MRV process. Non-compliant firms may be fined or receive a warning (警告) 
from provincial authorities. Most pilot carbon market areas regularly achieve over 99% 
compliance rates. Tianjin had the lowest compliance rate at 96.5% in 2014 (see Table 5) 
(Shuang). Many stakeholders also concede that Tianjin is one of the poorer-performing 
pilots, but the difference in actual compliance rates hardly reveals this concern. The 
metric is so aggregated as to obscure underlying heterogeneity in the MRV process.  
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Table 5: Compliance Rates of China’s Pilot Carbon Markets, 2014 and 2015 
Pilot Area Compliance Rate 2014 Compliance Rate 2015 
Beijing 97.1% 100% 
Tianjin 96.5% 99.1% 
Shanghai 100% 100% 
Guangdong 99% 100% 
Shenzhen 99.4% 99.6% 
Hubei NA 100% 
Chongqing NA NA 
 
BAD DATA, RESTRICTED DATA 
What heterogeneity is being obscured? In this section, I discuss the ways in which some 
kinds of data are ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than others in terms of meeting national and 
international standards for carbon market emissions accounting and MRV. I propose 
thinking of variation in emissions data along two axes, data quality and data quantity. 
Emissions data quality, that is, the extent to which a firm’s report of its emissions 
matches its actual emissions, varies based on the sector, location, and company type for a 
given plant. Data quantity refers to the number of estimates for a given firm’s emissions – 
this could be over time, by different reporters who regularly audit a plant’s emissions, or 
having the data available in multiple forms and places. A given plant could fall anywhere 
along these two axes (i.e. low data quality but high quantity, low quantity but high quality, 
etc.). However, standardization of emissions data refers to the push towards high data 
quantity and quality (Figure 12). In this section, I discuss the ways in which sector, 
location, and company type affect data variation.    
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Figure 12: Schematic of Variation in Emissions Data 
 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, China’s national carbon market was 
originally planned to cover 14 sectors, but now it only covers one, the power sector. This 
narrowing of scope is due to the fact that the power sector, for various reasons, currently 
has the most complete and verifiable emissions data. Why? Electric power plants can 
precisely meter their output, which can be used to back-calculate CO2 emissions using an 
assumed emissions factor or a laboratory-measured calorific content of the fuel a plant is 
using. Other industries, like the cement industry, face challenges in measuring emissions 
from electricity used on-site as well as process GHG emissions from the industrial 
processes themselves (e.g. calcination in cement production, or electrolysis in aluminum 
production). Not only does the power sector generally have more and better quality data 
on firm-level carbon dioxide emissions, it is also the sector with the most pilot-based 
experience (see Table 6 below). In addition, some industries have relatively well-
organized industry groups that help their members estimate emissions. For example, the 
China Metallurgical Industry Planning and Research Institute (an industry group for the 
metals industry) has spent many years keeping track of China’s carbon market policy 
developments, even working with the World Steel Association, a global industry group, 
to provide an emissions calculation tool to their members. The China Electricity Council 
represents over 100 electricity enterprises, including State Grid and generation and 
planning companies, and has several carbon market staff.  
 
Table 6: Sectors Covered by Carbon Market Pilots 
Pilot Area Sectors Covered 
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Beijing Electricity, heating, cement, petrochemicals, public 
buildings 
Chongqing Electricity, cement, chemicals, iron and steel, 
metallurgy 
Guangdong Electricity, cement, petrochemicals, iron and steel, 
public services 
Hubei Electricity, heating, cement, chemicals and 
petrochemicals, iron and steel, metallurgy, automobile 
equipment, medical buildings, food processing, 
papermaking 
Shanghai Electricity, chemicals and petrochemicals, iron and 
steel, metallurgy, building materials, papermaking, 
textiles, aviation, public buildings, railway stations 
Shenzhen Electricity, buildings, manufacturing, water supply 
Tianjin Electricity, heating, chemicals and petrochemicals, iron 
and steel, oil and gas exploration 
 
Differences in data quality and quantity by sector are also related to historical tendencies 
of certain sectors to be more centralized and proximal to national and global resources, 
compared to others that may be decentralized and disorganized. The power generation 
sector, for example, is mostly controlled by five major state-owned companies, while 
some other sectors consist mostly of small, private companies. These intertwined 
technological and political characteristics influence the ability to account for emissions 
sector by sector. However, one carbon market consultant provided a more cynical 
explanation for this sectoral variation in data quality: sectors are being phased in one-by-
one so that the national government doesn’t have to admit the data is wrong all at the 
same time.  
Given the aforementioned variation in data by sector, why is it that the pilots have been 
regulating multiple sectors, while the national carbon market had to start with just the 
power sector? First, the local DRCs managing the pilot carbon markets have closer links 
to the industries in their jurisdictions than the national government does to enterprises 
around the country (“the mountains are high and the emperor is far away”, as the Chinese 
adage goes). Meanwhile, non-pilot regions are proving more difficult to gather data from 
than those areas already participating in carbon markets. Particular regions of China, 
notably the northwest “interior” and far northeast, are explained as having less capacity to 
participate in the emissions accounting and MRV processes. These discrepancies may 
also be framed around equity. As one academic put it, “I know it should in theory, but 
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will a ton of carbon emitted in Qinghai really be priced the same as a ton of carbon 
emitted in the East?”, referring to the variation in burden of mitigation between poor and 
rich areas of China. 
However, it’s not just the interior provinces that are seen as have lower data quality. One 
researcher expressed his skepticism regarding the quality of all emissions data from 
outside of Beijing. Another told of a richer province’s officials mistrusting emissions data 
from a province they saw as less developed. Even in the richer province, though, not all 
enterprises have finished reporting their emissions data. An empirical research paper 
compared self-reported emissions with third-party verifier reports for regulated firms in 
the Beijing and Hubei pilot carbon markets, finding no evidence of deliberate 
misreporting. The findings indicated that Beijing firms were learning how to report their 
data better over time. Tellingly, however, the authors wrote that, “Although the Hubei 
ETS required firms to submit self-reported emissions, a significant number of firms did 
not submit them due to inattention, weak internal capacity or limited enforcement by the 
local government,” leading to a sample size of 63 firms for Hubei compared to Beijing’s 
403 (Zhang et al. 2019).   
The type of company that owns a regulated firm can also play a role in data quality and 
quantity. Large state-owned enterprises often have experienced staff – and strong 
political will – to manage emissions accounting and MRV. However, there are still many 
small firms that lack expertise, experience, and motivation to do proper and regular 
emissions accounting. These differences are discussed more in the capacity building 
section later in this chapter. Some carbon market stakeholders are optimistic about the 
progress of emissions accounting. At a small meeting with national and provincial 
officials, external consultants, and a few others, a representative of a regulated company 
admitted that their company had been noncompliant because they had reported their 
emissions incorrectly. This was not intentional – rather, they simply hadn’t known how. 
The company had to pay a fee, but also felt positively about learning how to do the 
emissions accounting properly afterwards. A consultant described the trusting, tolerant 
atmosphere in the room as a remarkable sign of progress.   
Innocent mistakes and good intentions aside, the ideal carbon market relies on game-
theoretic cooperation of all regulated entities in reporting their emissions, so that the 
national regulator can use complete information to allocate emissions allowances each 
compliance period. If allocations of carbon allowances are made based on incorrect data, 
the overall cap on emissions could be weak, leading to low prices and sluggish demand 
that do little to drive emissions reduction (something the EU ETS has especially 
struggled with). Provincial officials worry about the national carbon market because data 
quality could be so poor as to “tank the market”, scrapping years of effort on the part of 
local governments to develop emissions accounting processes and cultivate goodwill with 
the national government and regulated companies. For many stakeholders, data quality 
entirely out of their control is the most concerning challenge for the national carbon 
market.  
These concerns about data quality go hand-in-hand with extremely strict control of 
emissions data. Even among the carbon markets personnel at the NCSC, only a small 
subset of staff can see the emissions accounts. Consultants, NGOs, and other external 
44 
 
stakeholders have never seen national emissions inventories or actual emissions data. One 
NGO representative lamented that this lack of information, especially on accuracy of the 
emissions data or performance of the data collection process, prevented advocacy groups 
from even formulating a stance on China’s carbon market. The NCSC has contracted 
select teams at academic institutions and consultancies to use the official emissions 
accounts to help formulate aspects of the carbon market design, but this only increases 
the insider/outsider dimension of data access. “The data is very secure – it must be 
protected,” said one of these academics. The extreme “security” around emissions data 
seems at odds with the need for complete information for a perfect market, but is in fact a 
logical response on the part of national policymakers dealing with incredible variation as 
well as the need to consolidate authority. This variation in data quantity, and the links 
between access, authority, and expertise, are further explored in the next section, “From 
Data to Decision-Making”.  
 
THE WILD WEST OF VERIFICATION 
These variations in data quality and quantity, as well as the national government’s 
requirement for two separate third-party verifiers to verify each emissions report, have 
created a sudden and large demand for verification services. For the pilots, the local 
authority selects authorized verifiers, and in the early stages of carbon trading, even pays 
them for verification services. Eventually, the national government will also select 
authorized verifiers for the national carbon market – a tremendous opportunity for any 
company that receives authorization. Third-party auditing and verification of emissions is 
a fraught business that has faced challenges in the past, and is highly dependent on 
regulatory structure (Duflo et al. 2013).  
The institutions providing verification services for China’s carbon market vary a lot as 
well. They range from established consultancies with a high-profile brand, like 
SinoCarbon, to hundreds of small, newly established companies and services. 
SinoCarbon is an authorized verifier for all of the pilots – in fact, they helped the national 
government come up with the MRV guidelines, and are well trusted for their expertise. 
While there are also small carbon and emissions-specialized companies that have 
emerged to help companies prepare for verification, many verifiers are new to the carbon 
market. Some are pre-existing independent companies like energy auditors who saw the 
“gap” and “huge demand” for verification from thousands of facilities suddenly needing 
to verify their emissions. One consultant who helps train stakeholders on emissions 
accounting claims that a lot of the verifiers are “bad quality”. “It’s dangerous if these 
verifiers do a bad job. The companies might provide honest, accurate data, and then the 
verifiers provide bad data, and this will lead to mistakes in the allocation process and 
harm the future ETS.” This cements the need for capacity building trainings like the ones 
their organization provides.  
Some regulated firms are not self-reporting at all, and are simply letting third-party 
verifiers do the work of the “initial” emissions reporting. This leads to a semantic 
paradox – is “verification” even verification without the first step of self-reporting? When 
I asked one researcher why some companies weren’t self-reporting, they replied, “Maybe 
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they didn’t want to. They didn’t want to spend any energy on it.” Meanwhile, as 
discussed earlier, it is not uncommon for a company’s self-reported emissions and the 
verifier’s reported emissions to diverge. “The training level of people at different 
verification companies may differ, or they may think about things differently,” the 
researcher explained. 
Would emissions accounting be more trustworthy with the help of technology? China has 
invested heavily in Continuous Emissions Monitoring Systems (CEMS) for air pollution 
emissions. The China National Environmental Monitoring Centre even publishes real-
time air pollution data by city on their website.10 CEMS encompasses a range of 
technologies, but refers specifically to monitoring technologies at the plant level that 
directly measure emissions. The promise of CEMS is that it can deliver the complete 
information necessary for a ‘perfect’ market, rendering emissions reporting transparent 
by objectively recording plant-level emissions, and bypassing the other main approaches 
to estimating a plant’s CO2 emissions, namely mass balance, which requires calculation 
of the difference in carbon entering and exiting the plant in feedstock and products to 
estimate the CO2 emissions.  
However, CEMS technology has not delivered on its promise in China. One study found 
that key regions in China facing new, stringent sulfur dioxide regulations reported CEMS 
data with a larger decrease in sulfur dioxide emissions than could be corroborated from 
NASA satellite data, which the researchers called “suggestive of misreporting” (Karplus 
et al. 2018). Even with purportedly accurate and objective technologies, CEMS data still 
must be reported by companies to local authorities, and are thus subject to interpretation 
by those doing the reporting. In MEE audits, local EPBs have been caught forging 
meeting notes, destroying computer records, and giving companies advance notice of 
inspections (Xie 2019). 
There has been some dialogue about using CEMS to monitor carbon dioxide emissions 
for China’s carbon market, since it is already used to monitor sulfur dioxide emissions 
from power plants in many parts of China. CEMS could be an alternative to the unruly 
third-party verifiers currently used for CO2 emissions accounting and their calculation-
based mass balance approach. However, to fulfill the promise of technological 
omnipotence, many aspects of the reporting system would need to be standardized and 
enforced. As one consultant put it, “There would need to be significant checks on the 
CEMS system, and an institutionalization of these checks, to prevent manipulation. 
CEMS could reduce the number of third party verifiers that are needed, which is good 
and efficient. However, any CEMS system would still need ‘human’ interaction.” Even if 
misreporting could be eliminated, technology can be used to thwart technology. CEMS 
was used for carbon accounting for CDM-era projects, but there were anecdotes of 
factories implementing CEMS systems and later re-configuring the measurement devices 
to falsify data. More recently, MEE inspections in Shanxi and Ningxia provinces found 
instances of air pollution monitoring machines being sprayed with water to alter readings, 
with one EPB chief going so far as to pay someone to block surveillance footage of the 
act. In Henan province, a sealed CEMS system was interfered with using a wireless 
mouse (Xie 2019). Thus, even a measurement device is subject to technological 
                                                10	http://www.cnemc.cn/	
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manipulation. Still, the consultant was enthusiastic about even more cutting edge 
technologies, like blockchain, that could solve the current imperfections of measurement 
and reporting technology if ever brought into use.  
After an original timeline for launching the national carbon market in 2017, the recent 
reframing of its launch as a ‘foundation building’ exercise speaks to the heterogeneity of 
the emissions accounting and MRV process, which has fallen short of national 
policymakers’ ambitions. Many fear that “bad data” could “tank the whole market”, 
meaning that the carbon market as a whole could be ineffective as a policy instrument 
and unimpressive to an international audience. Like many kinds of data in China, 
emissions data is managed closely by national authorities. An entire market for third-
party verification has emerged alongside – or within – the carbon market, with the goal of 
promoting standardization of the quantity and quality of emissions reports. However, for 
now, these verifiers often end up increasing data quantity but not quality. In addition, due 
to the risks of misreporting, technology is not yet able to deliver the data transparency 
needed for a ‘perfect’ market. This datascape, filled with fear, skepticism, ambition, and 
opportunism on the part of various actors, reveals the incredible heterogeneity of 
emissions data in China in comparison to the global vision of standard emissions 
reporting protocols.  
Mackenzie (2009) lays out how the IPCC’s authority in establishing the metric of 
“Global Warming Potential” for various greenhouse gases has been an essential part of 
making emissions commensurable and thus tradable in the CDM and the EU ETS. 
Although China’s national carbon market only regulates one gas – carbon dioxide – it 
faces a similarly momentous task in establishing a consistent, standardized, and 
authoritative structure for emissions accounting across many industries, regions, and 
layers of government. This process of ‘state simplification’ and legibility, a la James 
Scott, is also a story of the state (as expressed by the NCSC, formerly in the NDRC and 
now under the MEE) attempting to tame a wild, heterogeneous landscape of industries 
and enterprises that were previously very far from the emperor. Since emissions data is so 
correlated with production and energy, other major management loci for the Chinese 
government, the state sees the extraction of this data as worth major investment – such as 
the government paying for all verification services in the early stages of emissions 
accounting. In fact, the standardization of emissions accounting and MRV is an 
incredible process of making the Chinese state’s subjects far more knowable by 
incorporating them into a regular, standardized routine of revealing their innermost 
workings.  
 
FROM DATA TO DECISIONS: MODELS, MODELERS, AND EXPERTISE 
Amidst the arduous collection of emissions data and attempts to standardize the process, 
how do China’s policymakers then take this information to decide how the national 
carbon market will work? To what extent does emissions data inform policy decisions, or 
are there other considerations guiding China’s carbon market designers? By carbon 
market design, I am referring to the details that vary across carbon markets. The basic 
principle of cap-and-trade stands, but the way the cap is set (an absolute or intensity-
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based cap, for example), the number of sectors covered, the threshold for inclusion, and 
the method for allocating permits are all aspects of the design that policymakers must 
decide. 
“Science-based policymaking” and “evidence-based policymaking” have become 
buzzwords for public policy around the world, indicating the desire to incorporate 
objective and scientific information into policy decisions. However, a rich body of 
literature on the interface of science and policy also reveals the highly subjective nature 
of public policy in spite of such aspirations, while also identifying a wide range of other 
factors besides scientific evidence that shape policy design and outcomes. China’s carbon 
market lies somewhere between “evidence-based policymaking” and “policy-based 
evidence making”, with a wide range of experts and elites, each with their own sets of 
skills and motivations, shaping the key design parameters of the national market.  
Since Mao’s death and the onset of Reform and Opening Up, Chinese elite policymaking 
has been dominated by a technocratic order of leaders, Red Engineers who have 
consolidated not only power but also a technocratic management philosophy (Andreas 
2009). Despite the incredible concentration of trained engineers among China’s current 
elite policymakers, technical knowledge alone is far from enough for these policymakers 
to achieve their goals. Among these elites, factions are critical for advancing political 
ambition, suggesting that promotion of officials depends not on achievement of policy 
goals but rather factional ties and even educational pedigree (Shih et al. 2012). Expertise 
and connections are deeply intertwined. This network of connections and expertise has 
ossified into bureaucratic structures, a key determinant of policy outcomes (Lieberthal 
and Oksenberg 1988).  
In this section, I contextualize the space between expert research and policy in the 
making of China’s carbon market. The section overall shows how people form and 
deploy technical expertise in the carbon market policymaking process. This exploration 
of expertise is a critical prelude to the subsequent discussion on capacity building. I begin 
with a survey of the computational models used in research related to China’s carbon 
market, since models are a frequently used to simulate the effects of a policy. I show that 
while models are often separate from the carbon market policymaking, they are a critical 
tool that is generative of expertise and authority. Next, the section explores the technical 
lives of experts and their aspirations. This discussion opens up a new, ethnographic space 
to think about how carbon market policymakers make decisions – a space that adds 
dimension to traditional political economic constructions of policymaking. I draw 
inspiration from the rich ethnographic STS literature on scientists and experts, such as 
Joseph Masco’s study of nuclear scientists and their technoaesthetic engagement with 
their work (Masco 2013). I focus on how China’s expert policy modelers engage with 
their tools and the knowledge they produce. 
 
MODEL IDENTITIES 
I take computational models as a focal point for understanding how experts inform policy 
in the context of China’s carbon market. Models are a useful policy tool. They can help 
policymakers predict the effects of their policies, and simulate different versions of 
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policy design. Models create simplified representations of carbon markets in order to 
elaborate potential scenarios and aid decision-making. This necessary simplification in 
fact parallels the China’s efforts towards creating a standardized carbon market.  
Many carbon market experts build their cachet and professional identities around 
computational models. Lü is one such expert turned policy commentator. One hot 
summer day in 2017, I go to visit Lü, who is a researcher at the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences. Cool and silent, this CAS building is a welcome respite from the Beijing streets. 
Lü is extremely knowledgeable about technical details of China’s carbon market and how 
to represent them in computational models. He is one of several government modelers 
who use CGE models to study energy policies at CAS and the NDRC’s various think 
tanks. They publish academic papers and also write up their research for government 
officials in the form of policy briefs or discussion drafts (讲话稿). Lü takes pride in his 
fluency in the programming languages underlying his model, and subsequently looks 
down on point-and-click software overlays that make models usable by a broader 
audience. Referring to the highly technical yet tedious work of writing and checking code 
and parsing data, he says that he usually provides the “hard labor” (劳动) for his 
modeling collaborations, because it’s what he enjoys.  
Though sometimes competitive with the other research groups at CAS, Lü has a 
remarkably diverse network of collaborators and co-authors across other research 
institutes and universities. He believes that CGE models are highly useful because they 
are one of the only tools that can track value flows in an economy, which he does when 
he models carbon taxes or carbon markets that recycle the revenue from the policy to 
some other sector or group (see Chapter 3). 
However, it is not only professors and government researchers engaging in carbon market 
modeling. Zheng is a government researcher who also moonlights as a private consultant 
for energy modeling. When we first met, he proposed a street intersection. I assumed I 
would meet him there and then go to his government office building, perhaps one cold 
and imposing like CAS. Instead, his office was actually in a small residential apartment 
converted into a shabby, single-room office with several men typing away at computers. 
We all crammed around a small folding table to chat. Some of them had their own 
individual consultancies, though all worked at other places for their primary job. They 
ranged in age from one fresh-faced recent graduate to middle-aged, seasoned modelers, 
but all shared an enthusiasm for the model they jointly developed. The proximity of their 
makeshift office to the government building where Zheng worked revealed their main 
client. The ‘moonlighting’ feel to the venture spoke to the nascence and uncertainty of 
consulting-type modeling in a field crowded with credentialed academic researchers. Yet, 
their combined expertise was formidable, and their business was good. “Relationships are 
important for funding,” explained Zheng, “and we have good long-term relationships.” 
We talked for several hours, and I eventually had to plead exhaustion, as their ability to 
talk shop for hours was remarkable. 
Researchers like Lü and Zheng publish prolifically in academic journals. An abundance 
of academic papers model China’s carbon market, with various methodological 
approaches (see Chapter 3). Some provide policy recommendations, while others are 
49 
 
meant to advance the methodology or theory. These models and their makers work on the 
periphery of the carbon market. Modeling the carbon market can be a profitable exercise. 
In the near term, modelers can attract clients or research grants to simulate various 
policies such as the carbon market. In the long term, models can make reputations and 
careers. 
CGE models are emblematic of efforts to use structural computational models to estimate 
the potential effects of a carbon market. They are very commonly used to study economic, 
environmental, and energy policies. The same model can be applied to several different 
types of policies with minimal adjustment. While some researchers use CGE models 
primarily for economic research, especially on taxes and trade, recently, CGE models 
have been increasingly applied to energy and environmental policy. In light of the 
“empirical revolution”, which has popularized econometric methods (Angrist and Pischke 
2010), CGE models are not in use in most academic economics departments. However, 
they do enjoy popularity in applied departments as well as in private sector consulting 
firms, development banks, government agencies, and other non-academic institutions. 
One student told me that CGE models are especially popular in China: “Econometrics is 
too simple. A CGE model can help you win a bigger grant from the Department of 
Education or such places.” In fact, CGE models are descended from the early Soviet 
planning tool of input-output tables (see Chapter 2). Their popularity in China speaks to a 
continuity of the planned economy in quantitative tools. Ironically, even though the 
planned economy has seemingly been put to rest, the tools of the past are being use to 
build, study, and analyze the market economy.  
However, CGE models are not the only kind of computational models used to assess 
climate and energy policy effects. CGE models are often classified as “top-down” models 
because they do not have a detailed or technology-based representation of the energy 
sector, but rather trace effects from aggregated production and consumption data down 
towards sectors of interest. In contrast, “bottom-up” energy models, sometimes called 
engineering models, take individual firms or technologies as the unit of analysis and 
model their effects upwards towards aggregated impacts. However, they tend to lack 
detailed consideration of economic factors. Some research groups attempt to merge these 
models, though in practice this is often using the output of one model as the input to 
another model. For example, the electricity demand predicted by a CGE model could be 
used to calibrate an engineering model of the electricity sector.  
Bottom-up models are a large, diverse class of models. For researchers with an 
engineering background, they may be more intuitive or attractive. Certainly such models 
are in heavy rotation at the government think tanks that provide supporting research for 
the carbon market. One PhD student who studied the carbon market bemoaned his choice 
to invest his time in learning CGE models, since he felt that his classmates had selected 
more popular (and more publishable) optimization-based bottom-up models. There is a 
lack of pedagogy around structural computational modeling, and most students arduously 
teach themselves. The code and software for models are passed around student-to-student 
within a research group on USB sticks.  
Research groups that model the carbon market are primarily defined around their creation, 
management, and use of a model. These models may also spur collaboration between 
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research groups in China and abroad. For example, the MIT EPPA CGE model has been 
adapted to the Chinese economy, and re-named C-GEM or C-REM (depending on the 
spatial scope of the model), although the majority of the code and the fundamentals of the 
theory remain the same. Researchers at Tsinghua use C-GEM and C-REM to simulate a 
variety of energy and environmental policies in China, while those at MIT, sometimes 
separately and sometimes together with Chinese colleagues, apply the EPPA model to a 
range of research questions. A similar process has worked for other modeling groups 
across China.  
Typically, the adaptation of these models to the Chinese context is done by students, 
research staff, or professors from a Chinese institution doing research exchanges at a 
university abroad, where a model already exists and is being used. “We have learned and 
imported many techniques from foreigners,” said one Tsinghua professor. The State 
Information Council, a think tank of the NDRC that also has several researchers using 
CGE models to assess energy policy, uses a CGE model that is based on a CGE model at 
Monash University in Australia. The lineage of a Chinese model can be traced by 
following the trail of research exchanges, and models are proliferating as alumni and 
friendships move across schools. Modelers find comrades and research partners through 
the work of building and expanding models, and the model comes to shape their 
professional networks and identities. 
The complexity of a model makes it a useful object around which to exchange funding 
and expertise. Complexity, to an extent, opens up a wider range of analytical techniques 
and applications. The model is the foundation of international collaborations, the glue of 
research groups and nascent consultancies, and the technology for which funding is 
raised. Publications and conference opportunities are churned out from model clusters, 
not to mention livelihoods, in the case of consultant-modelers like Zheng.  
However, the complexity of models also makes them difficult to apply directly to the 
carbon market design process. If emissions monitoring technologies and reporting 
software are the beginning of the data pipeline, models are an endpoint in the 
infrastructure of the carbon market, where data ends up in highly simplified and stylized 
formats to assist with abstract thought exercises. In the next section, I show how the 
incomplete, distributed, heterogeneous nature of the firm-level emissions datascape 
(explored in the previous section) determines the analytical techniques used to manage it. 
Models and modelers are moved to the periphery, and provide indirect input to the carbon 
market design process by cementing individual and group reputations.  
 
MAKING EXPERTISE, MAKING POLICY 
Data and models are often put forth as objective quantitative tools to aid the design of 
policy; at the same time, these quantitative tools are constructed within a complex, 
heterogeneous sociopolitical system. They directly and indirectly enable the generation of 
expertise. Modeling work, though not directly used to inform policy, helps define 
research groups and their expert capacity. For China’s carbon markets, policymakers 
have systematically outsourced expertise and cultivated networks of experts, both at the 
national level and for pilot carbon markets. This expertise on the carbon market is 
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primarily consolidated and exchanged through a high-level steering committee for the 
national carbon market, convened by the MEE. It is made up of government officials, 
industry group representatives, some consultants, and many academics. 
Besides assisting with the steering committee, local academics and government affiliated 
researchers like Lü also provide direct analysis for the national government. Name-brand 
consulting companies, especially international ones, are too expensive and may not 
understand the Chinese context. “Within China, what brand is better than Tsinghua? Who 
is better than Professor X, Y, or Z?” Lü asks, mentioning well-regarded professors who 
are involved in the carbon market design process. “A no-name private company couldn’t 
compete with them.” While some international consultancies and agencies are involved in 
China’s national carbon market process, they tend to be called upon as experts for 
capacity building rather than direct policymaking.  
Professor Wu is one of the oft-contracted experts for carbon-market related work for the 
national government. She has a staggering range of projects. Grants from the National 
Natural Science Foundation serve as stable funding that give her flexibility in her 
research, while she is currently working with several different national government 
ministries on short-term projects. She also consults with the local government on their 
pilot carbon market and other carbon dioxide emissions-related research. “We have a 
very good relationship with the local government. This helps with better policy and 
planning because we have data and experience within this region,” said Professor Wu. 
The sheer number and variety of government grants her research has received reveals the 
importance of long-term connections and trust between the government and the experts 
they hire.   
Despite this hodgepodge of projects, Professor Wu saw a very clear delineation between 
her academic research and research for government audiences (“the policy design track”). 
As she explained to me, government research is conducted through two channels: the first 
by doing the research and then working to communicate it to the relevant officials, and 
the second through government solicitation. The latter is more common; indeed, for some 
professors, it is the ultimate goal that motivates pursuing the first channel. The 
boundaries around government research are also very clear when it comes to accessing 
data. “The NDRC gave us data on the emissions trading system, but we are explicitly not 
allowed to use it for publications. We are only allowed to use it to do projects for them,” 
she said. In fact, one of her collaborators wants to use the data to do several different 
kinds of analysis, but each analysis requires a separate approval process even though it 
would use the same data.  
The government is not deploying complex models like CGE models in the carbon market 
design process. “There are many papers on the Chinese ETS allowance allocation 
scheme, but this is just academic research. They’re never going to accept the theoretical 
approach in my paper – it’s for publications only,” said another professor who had helped 
with the design of one of the pilot carbon markets. In part, this is because of the inability 
of the model to simulate reality. Data underpinning many models is outdated and lacks 
detail. Boundaries may differ – for example, the iron and steel sector as represented in a 
model is may be defined differently that for the proposed carbon market. The model 
necessarily simplifies these highly detailed disaggregations of firm-level detail, and this 
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makes it less useful for the policy process. “In China, the policymakers don’t directly use 
models. They converge many studies and look at results from many researchers. We 
didn’t use any complicated sort of model (我们没有用什么复杂的模型),” said Professor 
Wu, who explained her process of choosing an emissions intensity benchmark for 
covered power plants: “We just looked at the data and found the average.”  
The outsourcing of expertise – and the entrustment of methodological approaches – to a 
cultivated group of academics is a necessary move on the part of the overextended 
NCSC. People explain this overextension in several ways. First, there simply aren’t 
enough staffers to go around (I hear estimates of 70 people total in the NCSC with around 
20 working on carbon markets). Hiring more staff is nearly impossible, because creating 
a new agency job requires an individual application to the State Council for every 
position. Nor can the NCSC take on students or interns to help them, as academics can. A 
second and somewhat related explanation is the lack of complete technical knowhow on 
the part of the NCSC staff. Some say they have too many engineers, others say they have 
too many economists; either way, the NCSC staff are driven to solicit specific expertise 
from their expert networks.  
Some of the called-upon experts take pride in their work helping with the carbon markets. 
A professor in Shenzhen claimed that the Shenzhen pilot’s success (it was the first pilot 
to launch) was because academic economists like her were so involved in the design of 
the system relative to other pilots. Others dread the work – one young professor in 
Guangdong complained about the endless reports for the local government, many of 
which he felt demanded impossible predictions about how the carbon market would 
perform in the future. Interestingly, Professor Wu, though proficient with modeling and 
quantitative analysis, sees herself as a policy design expert, and rarely publishes in 
academic journals. The high-profile work is left to her more senior colleagues, who both 
publish more and are more visibly involved in the public sphere of the national carbon 
market, from the steering committees to frequent appearances to give talks. Experts vary 
in their relationship with their expertise, as the next section further unpacks.  
 
WINNING AT LIFE? 
Modelers can build coveted careers based on their expertise. The community is tight-knit 
and hyper-aware of each other. Students, who maintain and expand models, look up to 
their professors, the progenitors of each lab group’s model. One professor was one of the 
first scholars in China to begin using CGE models. His wife also has a PhD, which, 
according to his student, means they were allowed to have two children, circumventing 
the one-child policy (which was more strict at the time). The wife’s second pregnancy 
turned out to be twins. “They have three kids in the city. He’s really 人生赢家 (winning 
at life),” says his student, practically green with envy. Another expert is rumored to have 
China’s energy system model in his head: “Whenever he gives a speech or says a statistic 
about energy, researchers around China will re-calibrate their models to his number.”  
But what is life really like for these winning experts? One NCSC official who has reality-
defying abilities to appear at climate and energy policy events around the world confesses 
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that in the 20 or so years that he’s been working, he has almost never traveled for fun. He 
began as an energy modeler, but has since shifted to policy work that relies more on 
meetings, speeches, and reports. I ask him what he is doing for the upcoming national 
holiday, and he says he will be finishing reports. “We often have little notice before 
having to write a report or provide some technical information. And we have to write a 
report about everything we do, every event we attended. I miss my college years, that was 
a break, a relatively relaxed time.” The universal downside of being in-demand for one’s 
expertise is have little time to oneself.   
Indeed, juxtaposed with these expert “winners at life” are the shifting ambitions of their 
would-be successors. In their early years, energy and environment students express the 
desire to go to academic and government research positions, like their mentors. Yet each 
of these destinations has its unique challenges that eventually become insurmountable for 
those seeking them. These days, academic jobs in Beijing are nearly impossible to get for 
those with PhDs from Chinese universities, says every student I meet. Chinese 
universities prefer to hire professors with foreign degrees. While the professors on the 
carbon market advisory committees supervise and graduate many students each year, few 
of their students even attempt to follow in their footsteps. When I first meet a researcher 
named Wang, she has been working abroad as a post-doc for several years. She 
contributes to several projects related to China’s national carbon market. Pensive, 
focused, and straightforward, she has held the goal of becoming a professor at Tsinghua 
for the several years I have known her. Because she did her PhD at a Chinese university, 
she feels it will be difficult for her to get an academic position. She sees her extended 
post-doc abroad as penance for those PhD years wasted in China. But her heart is set on 
becoming a professor in China. “In China, there are not many ways to influence the 
government. For an ordinary citizen, perhaps one way is to become a professor.”  
“Working at the Energy Research Institute is my dream job,” a PhD student named Cong 
told me when I first met him. “People from my program are probably the most qualified 
people to go there and work on the carbon market,” he said confidently. As a government 
institution (事业单位), the Energy Research Institute think tank has a somewhat different 
hiring path than other positions at the NDRC, which are civil servant positions (公务人员
) managed by the State Council. The civil service exam, necessary to become a civil 
servant, is frequently mentioned as a major barrier for going into government jobs. “If 
100 people take the exam, maybe only one will be selected. The content isn’t even related 
to our subject of study,” says Cong. Government jobs have also become less appealing 
following Xi Jinping’s corruption crackdown. As Wang tells me, “Some of my friends 
from back home work for the provincial government. But now, after the campaign, they 
have to pay out-of-pocket for any work-related expenses, like cabs and meals, making it a 
financial hardship. The reimbursement process has a lot of red tape, it’s very difficult. 
They’re not corrupt, but they could become corrupted. Even officials in Beijing face 
these kinds of policies. So though I want to influence the government, I didn’t necessarily 
want to work for the government.”  
Given these obstacles, many graduating students from energy and environment programs 
in China end up going to finance and consulting companies. Some go to great lengths to 
conceal this intent to ‘defect’ from their advisors in their final years, hiding the fact that 
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they are traveling to take accounting exams or do job interviews. “We just want to make 
money, buy a house in Beijing, and enjoy the benefits of a higher salary.” For many 
graduating students, obtaining a Beijing residence permit (hukou) as quickly as possible 
is necessary to stay in Beijing. Many students have found romantic partners at other 
universities and want to make a life in Beijing together rather than returning to separate 
hometowns. SOEs and private companies can arrange Beijing hukous much faster than 
government jobs. Yet the defection away from energy models and towards financial 
models is also a testament to these young professionals’ expertise and skills. Financial 
models require many of the same skillsets as academic energy and environmental 
modeling, including data management, fluency with programming languages, and 
understanding of the mathematics behind optimization and other modeling methods. Hard 
skills trump soft idealism in determining the course of these budding experts’ careers. 
More than a year later, I check back in with Wang. She is now an assistant professor at 
Tsinghua – her exact goal. “I had to have a lot of patience. It’s a long story,” she says. I 
ask her if she still wants to work with the government. “After my years of trying to get 
tenure, I will. It’s the motivation for seeking this very job. But it will happen naturally 
after the tenure process.” I also check back in with Cong, the student who wanted to work 
for the government think tank. He is now at an oil company, a major Chinese SOE. “It’s 
not related to environmental protection at all,” he says wryly. He feels overqualified and 
underpaid. But, he has a Beijing hukou, a Beijing apartment, and a Beijing girlfriend. To 
many other students, he’s winning at life. 
Facing pushes from their line of work and pulls towards other types of jobs, the budding 
energy policy experts at many Chinese institutions may cycle out of the area they were 
trained in. Those who remain have a chance to “win at life” and cement their identities as 
the top experts. Policymakers often leverage these experts in efforts to standardize the 
making of the carbon market through capacity building, the topic of the next section. 
 
CAPACITY BUILDING: THE MARKET OF THE MARKET 
In the carbon market’s state of perceived delay, capacity building keeps aspirations alive 
by focusing on the future that is yet to come. Capacity building activities make the 
process of becoming productive for the actors involved. I argue that capacity building is, 
in fact, the sustaining force of the carbon market itself. Prior literature has identified 
excessive state intervention as both the source of problems and the lifeline for China’s 
carbon market. However, capacity building for the carbon market has become an 
ongoing, self-sustaining process in China that has eventually come to shape even the 
national government’s vision of China’s carbon market as a policy that must be 
neoliberally productive.  
International aid and development programs frequently frame their work as “capacity 
building” or “capacity development”.  Various trends in the 1980s and 1990s helped form 
the concept of capacity building: social movements in Latin America, increasing critique 
of the development industry, a new focus on people, diversity, and rights in “human-
centered development”, and the formalization of institutions as units for development 
(Sagar 2000) (Eade 1997). Capacity building is often described as a process or approach 
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that can span multiple levels from the individual to the institutional. Oxfam calls capacity 
building an “approach to development” guided by a long list of principles and caveats 
(Eade 1997). The United Nations Development Programme defines capacity development 
as a five-step process “through which individuals, organizations and societies obtain, 
strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their own development 
objectives over time” (UNDP 2009). Capacity building is now officially enshrined as a 
Sustainable Development Goal for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, with 
the target to “enhance international support for implementing effective and targeted 
capacity-building in developing countries to support national plans to implement all the 
sustainable development goals” (United Nations 2019). 
Capacity building in practice has been criticized as at odds with capacity building as 
discourse. “The results-oriented, bureaucratic imperatives of many government and donor 
agencies effectively nullify the long-term, participatory, and process-oriented approach to 
capacity building that is promoted in the discourse,” writes Leanne Black in a critical 
review of the capacity building literature (Black 2003). Capacity building is rarely for the 
smallholder – it is usually meant for state institutions and market facilitators, even though 
capacity could be built on any scale. Capacity building is a slippery term, a present 
participle that captures the essence of an interminable construction process with no clear 
end in sight. When has capacity been built? The term assumes a transfer from those with 
capacity to those without. In that sense, it is inseparable from the capacity builders’ 
vision of development.  
While not a development program per se, China’s carbon markets involve many 
institutions that also engage in development work, such as the World Bank and China’s 
own National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). The carbon market is a 
future-oriented policy – on an international stage, China’s leaders proclaim it will bring 
China’s industry in line with global visions of the climate future, while domestically, the 
policy is being used to standardize a new approach to clean, green, and marketized 
industry, The carbon market policy “renders technical” the material and economic 
processes that produce emissions. Tania Li investigates the deliberate depoliticizing of 
improvement schemes in Indonesia through their handling as technical problems to be 
managed by experts ( Li 2007). Improvements in any realm can be problematized and 
rendered technical, from public health to poverty alleviation, land management, and other 
social engineering schemes. In the process of rendering technical, development 
institutions morph from infrastructure developers to knowledge gatekeepers (Goldman 
2005). Many scholars like Timothy Mitchell and James Scott have explored this 
technocratic “rule of experts”. Even the modern term “economy” arose from a rendering 
technical of previously undefined processes of exchange, making possible “new forms of 
value, new kinds of equivalence, new practices of calculation, new relations between 
human agency and the nonhuman, and new distinctions between what was real and the 
forms of its representation” (Mitchell 2002).  
Like any market, the carbon market comes to fruition when all its participants adhere to 
standard accounting processes and begin to exchange the value of molecules of carbon 
dioxide across time and space. Capacity building problematizes the lack of capacity of 
various stakeholders, primarily local government and regulated companies, to participate 
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adequately in the carbon market; thus, capacity building is the engine that harmonizes the 
heterogeneous molecules and viewpoints of the carbon economy.  
 
THE TRAINING IN HAINAN 
Here, I introduce two attendees of the same capacity building exercise to show the kinds 
of experiential, professional, and financial opportunities that can arise for individuals 
involved with the making of the carbon market.  
Yang, a student at a top university in China, took a welcome break from his long days at 
the computer by flying to a carbon market training in Hainan, a tropical island and 
popular tourist destination in the South China Sea. The training was part of a larger 
program providing courses on carbon markets for developing countries. Last year and the 
year before, similar trainings had been held in Portugal, Thailand, and Belgium. This 
year, the workshop focused on China’s carbon market, with only Chinese trainees. 
The two dozen or so attendees came from Chinese universities, potential carbon traders 
and brokers (清算所), carbon exchanges, firms regulated by the carbon market, NGOs, 
and banks. Given his monthly stipend of around $900, Yang would not have attended the 
training on his own. In fact, none of the trainees had to pay to attend. The trainers, who 
were carbon market experts mostly from Europe, were also compensated for travel and 
lodging costs, due to funding from the sponsoring European organizations. Sizing up the 
hotel and meals during the conference, which were a welcome upgrade from the dorm 
and cafeteria at his university, Yang estimated that sponsors probably had to pay 10,000 
yuan (around $1,500) per trainee.  
On the first day of the training, Huang, a Chinese national who worked for one of the 
sponsoring European organizations, posted enthusiastic pictures, emojis, and updates to 
her WeChat social media account at the start of the conference. Huang believes that her 
organization, which has a small office in Beijing, has a personalized and therefore highly 
effective approach to the trainings they run in China. They allow a maximum of 40 
people at their trainings, in contrast to the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE), 
which also runs carbon market trainings throughout China, though for hundreds of people 
at a time. Huang says that at her organization’s trainings, there must be cooperation 
among the trainees, and they must at least all know each other’s names. She says this is 
the more efficient way to learn. In promoting her organization’s trainings, she seeks to 
clarify and demonstrate their competitive edge, which could attract more funding in the 
future. 
Huang thoroughly documented the training on social media, posting appealing photos 
from field visits to Hainan Airlines, one of the top airlines in China, and a biogas 
collection facility that were organized in collaboration with the Hainan government as a 
part of the training. She also shared daily photos of the lectures and discussions. At the 
end, she posted a photo of the certificate of participation she received, writing, “mission 
completed!!!”  
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For other trainings, Huang’s organization targets mainly local government officials, given 
their critical role in implementing China’s carbon market. Next, Huang’s organization 
will run trainings in Zhengzhou and Wuhan (Wuhan is in Hubei province, which hosts 
one of the pilot carbon markets), and their goal is to eventually run regional trainings in 
all parts of China. Hers is one of many institutions providing capacity building services 
for China’s carbon market. Huang estimates that there are over 100,000 people involved 
in China’s carbon market, from regulated facilities to verification groups, government 
officials, and consultants from foreign organizations, like herself.  
The Hainan training, labeled as a capacity building exercise, is exemplary of the meta-
market of capacity building. A free-flowing cluster of carbon market stakeholders was 
subsidized to exchange and align knowledge about China’s carbon market. The 
sponsoring organizations, in turn, were funded by larger institutions with an interest in 
expanding China’s carbon market, such as the European Commission (the EU has its own 
carbon market). Participants in the Hainan training by and large enjoyed the event and the 
opportunity to visit the beautiful island of Hainan. The organizers of the training also 
bolstered their reputation and their revenue - with several dozen trainees and trainers 
costing around $1500 per person, plus administrative overhead, the training organization 
probably received at least $100,000 for those few days – and this was just one of the 
many trainings they ran each year.  
I further shed light on the capacity building machine by dividing it into separate 
institutional actors in the following sections, detailing their position, perspectives, and 
potential opportunities from capacity building. Biedenkopf et al. (2017) identify three 
main actor groups that they argue are crucial for understanding capacity building as a 
policy infusion process: external financiers, implementing consultants, and local 
coordinators. Since different actors can have multiple functions, I instead organize actors 
by their type of institution. While pedantic, it allows for a more complex, cross-sectional 
look within these groupings. 
 
NATIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: CAPACITY PYRAMIDS 
Given the various bureaucratic and social bottlenecks for entry into the civil service and 
positions like those at the NCSC, the outsourcing of expertise is inevitable. The national 
carbon market policymakers have developed their own ways of cultivating networks of 
experts to fill their own capacity, a process described in the prior section, “From Data to 
Decisions”. How does the national government engage with building the capacity of 
other actors in the carbon market?  
The national government’s strategic shift towards capacity building has large costs. First, 
there is the direct cost of national and local government subsidies for emissions 
verification services, trainings and workshops for local government officials, and so on. 
Second, the designation of the first phase of the carbon market as the capacity building 
phase significantly pushes back the onset of actual carbon trading. National policymakers 
realized as early as 2017 that national-level trading would not happen on the original 
timeline laid out by top leaders, but official re-framing of this waiting period as a 
capacity building phase was not publicized until several years later. Finally, the recent 
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shift in bureaucratic structure has fractured the already fragile capacity of national 
policymakers and significantly slowed the onset of actual trading. When responsibility 
for carbon markets was transferred from the NDRC to the MEE, a similar shift had to 
happen for local governments, with local Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) 
taking over from the local DRCs. While the NCSC as a unit was transferred to the MEE 
without any physical relocation of offices or staff, this is not true for the local transfers. 
While some personnel from the local DRCs moved to the local EPBs, more are new 
hires. “They have to be trained from scratch. Some capacity was lost,” said one 
consultant. In addition, although the EPBs are authorized to collect fines and could 
enhance enforcement of the carbon market policy, local officials who previously 
managed carbon markets within the DRCs may not be willing to move to the EPBs, since 
the DRC is a more powerful agency in the governmental hierarchy.  
While many consultants I spoke with about this shift described its consequences in terms 
of waste and loss of capacity, from another angle, this is in fact a massive business 
opportunity for continued capacity building services. The restructuring has led to an even 
greater need for capacity building among local government officials. In fact, local 
government staff have always been the major target of capacity building efforts. They are 
the ones ultimately responsible for wrangling the regulated firms under their jurisdiction 
into compliance with the national carbon market. While each of the local governments in 
the pilot carbon market areas typically has its own network of experts from local 
universities and even international consultancies, capacity for the national carbon market 
both within and outside of pilot areas very much still needs to be built.  
According to one consultant, over 2,000 people affiliated with local DRCs have already 
received training. Many of the targeted trainees are directors or deputy directors who can 
presumably bring the rest of their staff into the fold of the carbon market. NDRC-issued 
invitations to trainings were necessary and highly effective for producing robust 
participation and attendance on the part of local governments. An implementer for one of 
the trainings with NDRC-issued invitations said, “We only had funding for six people 
from each local bureau to come. But many bureaus self-funded additional people just 
because they perceived it as very important – an invitation from the central government!” 
The clear prominence of carbon markets as a national government priority has even led 
some provinces to vie for participation. Fujian created a voluntary carbon market separate 
from the official pilots, while Sichuan, Zhejiang, Xinjiang, and Hunan are purportedly 
actively considering similar systems. Who could resist the opportunity to demonstrate 
enthusiasm for national strategic policies while also getting paid to it?  
For the Shenzhen pilot, proficiency in capacity building was key to marking it as one of 
the most successful pilots. Shenzhen as a municipality has fewer emissions sources and 
lower emissions than other pilot carbon market areas. The prospect of ratcheting down 
emissions in an already relatively low-emissions area may have motivated local 
policymakers to focus on their comparative advantage of capacity building. Shenzhen 
stakeholders took pride in their concentration of highly educated workers and their 
international connections, especially through proximity to Hong Kong. Within a year of 
announcing the goal to build a pilot carbon market, Shenzhen established a capacity 
building center (能力建设中心), the first of its kind among the pilots. Various 
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stakeholders in Shenzhen’s pilot carbon market were taken to California for a study tour 
(California has a state-level carbon market that started just before China’s pilots). 
“Tianjin and Chongqing were less successful because they did less capacity building,” 
said one Shenzhen carbon market expert.  
The logic of capacity building even creates opportunity for trainees to become trainers. A 
group of local officials from Shanghai has participated in trainings with one capacity 
building organization since 2010. Having attended around ten trainings total, including 
study tours abroad, they are now joining the national-level working groups of experts 
convened by the NCSC. If they are good students of official capacity building exercises, 
carbon market policymakers from local governments, especially those who have 
implemented pilot carbon markets, can easily become capacity builders for their new 
colleagues following restructuring and their counterparts in areas new to carbon markets. 
In cynical terms, this recruitment structure mirrors a pyramid scheme in its reliance on 
continuously seeking out new minds with un-built capacity. While the eventual goal is 
presumably to have a mature market where regulated companies internalize all this 
capacity, official restructuring and a strategic shift towards an official capacity building 
phase for the national carbon market have created at least several more years of booming 
demand for capacity building on the part of national and local government. 
 
CONSULTANCIES: A NUMBERS GAME 
Consultancies are the brokers who organize trainings for local governments and regulated 
companies on the part of the funders – national government and international 
organizations. Consultancies run trainings themselves as well as arrange for external 
experts to assist with the trainings. These consultancies, defined by being paid for their 
capacity building services, vary – from small to large companies, Chinese and 
international. With the announcement of the first phase of the carbon market as a 
foundation-building phase, consulting companies have increasingly framed their services 
as capacity building, now an attractive term for a range of international and domestic 
funders. 
The most high-profile carbon market consultant is SinoCarbon (中创碳投). Founded in 
2010, SinoCarbon now has employees in the hundreds and branches in most provinces. 
SinoCarbon is unique in that is both a consultancy as well as being explicitly involved in 
the policymaking process, such as the NCSC-convened expert committees, and assisting 
with the development of the allocation method for the national carbon market. 
SinoCarbon provides capacity building services through general carbon management 
trainings and detailed verification trainings. On top of a basic curriculum, these trainings 
may be tailored by sector or the level of the trainees (i.e. high-level managerial staff, or 
not). Regulated companies hire SinoCarbon to do personalized trainings, in addition to 
broader, semi-public trainings associated with national government sponsors. Their slick 
course materials include textbooks, pamphlets studded with photos and biographies of the 
high-profile experts they bring in for the trainings, and interactive materials like quizzes 
and mock trading exercises. “It’s the first company firms or pilots will hire to do capacity 
building or verification,” said one expert. SinoCarbon staff claim they have trained over 
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5,000 people. Part of the appeal of having one’s capacity built by SinoCarbon is that 
SinoCarbon can provide certifications for its trainings – certifications thast are issued by 
the national government human resources agency (人保部). High-level managers can 
participate in a carbon management program that leaves them with a prestigious 
certificate. Unlike most international organizations and consultancies, which focus on 
local government officials, SinoCarbon’s trainees are mostly from regulated firms in 
China, especially SOEs.  
While SinoCarbon stands tallest among the field of consultancies providing capacity 
building services, these consultancies have a shared vision of what capacity building 
means. First, the mantra “train the trainers” is echoed by almost every consultancy I have 
spoken to. Second, capacity builders are very focused on volume and throughput of their 
trainees. Trainings are handled in traunches and trainees grouped into ever-larger 
numbers. Consultancies track and regularly put forward the number of people they have 
trained as markers of their impact and thus importance. While many capacity building 
groups recognize the importance of quality over quantity in their training, the focus on 
throughput remains the same, even if with less volume. The standardized vision of the 
carbon market is designed to be spread ever farther and wider by the logic of China’s 
capacity building consultants. 
 
REGULATED COMPANIES: PUBLIC RECEPTION BENEFITS 
Contrary to the dynamics of carbon markets in many other countries, to-be regulated 
companies in China are often enthusiastic about participating in the carbon market. 
Larger SOEs are already aware of the national climate and clean energy agenda. 
Enthusiastic participation can have political rewards - the national government has been 
picking large SOEs and making positive examples of their contribution to the pilots. “The 
public reception benefits are large for playing along and even leading,” explains one 
consultant. Participating in the carbon market can be far preferable to shutting down 
operations, a frequent solution to overcapacity and the need to meet environmental 
targets in China’s past environmental policy. In addition, SOEs profits are unlikely to be 
affected by the carbon market due to their unique structure, with support coming from the 
government. With decades of experience with command-and-control environmental 
policy and pollution levies, regulated companies are familiar with having to “pay to 
pollute”.  
More elusive is the idea that these companies could save money by actively participating 
in the carbon market. The financial aspects of the carbon market are not yet incentives for 
firm participation, as has been detailed in the literature (Lo and Howes 2013). As 
discussed in the first section of this chapter, many companies are still getting the hang of 
MRV. “They wonder why they have to buy carbon, it’s so different from just buying 
tables and chairs,” said one carbon market expert. As the MRV process brings companies 
into a standardized protocol, further capacity building exercises are attempting to teach 
regulated companies about the financial possibilities of engaging in the market. Yang, the 
student at the carbon market training in Hainan, had doubts about how effective the 
training was. Trainees from the power sector struggled to understand the financial 
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opportunities from a carbon market because they could not grasp the concept of buying 
and selling allowances in a competitive market, given China’s tightly regulated power 
sector. “The carbon market is a burden to them, not an opportunity. They don’t want to 
make money; they just want to not lose money. They don’t care about carbon trading at 
all, they just want to comply,” Yang summarized. 
Increasingly, regulated companies are re-oriented their structures to meet the carbon 
market. Companies are increasingly hiring and designating staff to deal with the carbon 
market. As a representative from the China Electricity Council said, “setting up the 
carbon market is not a beautiful story. There is concrete work to do every day.” The CEC 
provides technology roadmaps and information on CEMS and MRV to help their member 
companies “have more choices.” While designated staff are increasingly being appointed, 
usually in financial departments (财务部) or environment and safety departments (环境
安全部), a huge range of employees from regulated companies attend capacity building 
trainings. “Our companies just have huge demand for capacity building and training, 
from the senior level to the junior level,” said a representative from a petrochemicals 
group. 
 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: OBJECTIVE EDUCATION 
There are roughly two types of international organizations engaged in capacity building 
for China’s carbon markets: international consultancies or NGOs that provide capacity 
building services, and international financiers, which may channel finance for capacity 
building through other organizations or may directly provide capacity building services 
themselves. Biedenkopf et al. 2017 characterized these non-Chinese financiers of 
capacity building projects for China’s carbon market: most financiers are national or 
subnational governments where there are already operating carbon markets – 
unsurprisingly, most financiers are European, where the EU ETS is. Some international 
organizations or research institutes also provide finance for capacity building. The 
European Union, Germany, and Norway are the largest governmental funders, while the 
World Bank’s Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR) “has the largest single project in 
financial terms, with a budget of $8 million” (Biedenkopf et al. 2017). The World Bank’s 
PMR is a global effort to prepare countries for carbon markets, and began working in 
China in the 2000s.  
International consultancies like Ecofys and ICF International have been involved with 
both the pilots and the national carbon market, often sub-contracted by the 
aforementioned agencies. One Chinese government official estimates that international 
organizations have spent several million USD on these carbon market capacity building 
activities – still much less than the Chinese government’s several hundred million.  
While domestic institutions are focused on getting the national carbon market off the 
ground, including the massive costs of verification, international organizations have the 
resources and distance to think of the bigger picture. A consortium of European 
governments is trying to build a post-2020 evaluation framework for the carbon market to 
assess its performance along the way. The European Commission is also “trying to get 
local stakeholders to have a better sense of long-term road-mapping,” says one of their 
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contractors. To achieve these big-picture goals, funding from these organizations comes 
in massive, multi-year traunches, with multiple phases and many partners, structured 
around plans and objectives. There are regular donor-implementer meetings where these 
cooperating groups discuss strategy. “We have to work together to ensure that work isn’t 
repeated, which would waste money. The NCSC doesn’t play a coordinating role at all, 
so we have to actively work together,” notes one international consultant. Indeed, there is 
a remarkable level of coordination and deliberate standardization among China-based 
international staff. Training materials from previous years are “recycled” to meet the 
need for “consistency”. “When we train people, it’s not propaganda, but rather an 
objective education about how to deal with the carbon market.” At an event on EU-China 
carbon market cooperation, I hear repeatedly that the Europeans do not want to “copy-
paste” their experience to China. Yet, while they are not copying and pasting a specific 
policy design, it is clear that there is an “objective” standard for the carbon market and its 
management that these myriad capacity building efforts are promoting. 
 
CARBON TRADERS: BRAVING THE MARKET 
Limited involvement from the financial sector is widely seen as a barrier to a strong 
carbon market in China (Lo 2016). However, while opportunities to make money from 
buying and selling carbon allowances generated by the carbon market may be limited in 
the near term for would-be carbon traders, there is tremendous economic opportunity in 
the capacity building meta-market. 
Carbon traders include the exchanges that manage allowance transactions (there is an 
exchange in every pilot carbon market area) as well as other types of organizations, like 
private consultancies and financial institutions, that are participating in the buying and 
selling of allowances for financial gain. So far, it has not been uncommon for investment 
institutions of various sizes in the pilot areas to buy up allowances in the beginning of the 
compliance period at low prices, then sell them at the end of the compliance period when 
the price is high. Regulated companies have to take the price at the end of the compliance 
period because “they have not been brave enough to evade this yet and buy and sell on 
the market,” says one professor who studies the financial aspects of the carbon market. 
However, aside from a few niche firms that have experience with carbon trading, the 
trading itself is not lucrative. The carbon exchanges are supposed to make money from 
managing these transactions, but most have actually shifted to consulting and capacity 
building, which are far more lucrative in the near term. Representatives from China’s 
carbon exchanges give lectures, assist with trainings, and participate in conferences 
around the country as they try to figure out their role while waiting for more opportunity 
from the actual trading of carbon. 
 
CONCLUSION 
An interpreter whom I befriended at a carbon market event offered her perspective: 
“Lack of capacity isn’t a problem in China. The carbon market must have been delayed 
for other reasons. You can just buy capacity. It’s like if a company doesn’t have a printer, 
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it’s cheaper to go pay to use one at another company rather than buying a whole printer 
for yourself.” Consulting organizations have generated a market for their printing 
services, so to speak. Prior literature has described these consulting organizations as 
competitive with each other, never conflicting outright but nonetheless working to carve 
out geographical and topical niches for their services (Biedenkopf et al. 2017). At the 
same time, they “reduce the costs of capacity development by virtue of specialization”, 
more effectively coordinating knowledge and skills transfer while “the tendencies for 
state domination in this process are declining” (Lo et al. 2018). Competition makes a 
service more efficient – a healthy neoliberal market.  
Local governments and regulated companies, instead of fully managing their own 
engagement with the carbon market, are simply outsourcing the work to a burgeoning 
consulting field. International financiers and the national government mostly foot the bill. 
The national government can make delay productive in the carbon market through 
capacity building. Thus, there is little incentive for anyone to wean themselves from the 
capacity building cycle just yet. 
Like blind men touching an elephant, external researchers have only a limited view into 
what kind of beast China’s national carbon market will prove to be. In this chapter, I have 
tried used my insight into quantitative modeling of the carbon market as an entry point to 
understanding the much broader nature of the carbon market itself. Through carbon 
market modeling, I saw how expertise was constructed and deployed – from there, I 
worked backwards, to uncover the fundamental data being gathered to inform the market, 
and forwards, to understand how expertise was being transferred in the form of capacity 
building to ever more carbon market trainees. I have reorganized this thought process into 
a story of how emissions data is collected, how decisions are made about how to regulate 
these emissions for the carbon market, and then how those decisions are put into standard 
practice through capacity building. In doing so, I try to move beyond current political 
economic studies of China’s carbon market. While providing illustrative stories that can 
contribute to the longstanding dialogue on the tensions of centralization and 
decentralization, state and market in China, I attempt to move beyond diagnosis of an 
imperfect market, and towards a specific explanation of how Chinese neoliberalism is 
being enacted through ecological civilization and the carbon market.  
China’s carbon markets capture the essence of ecological civilization, which insists on 
uniting economic growth and environmental protection. To operate, China’s national 
carbon market must spread the vision of a carbon commodity, once an invisible 
byproduct of industrial production. Facing challenges in the onset of trading carbon at the 
national level, national policymakers have elevated the spreading of this vision (called 
capacity building) as the first phase of the national carbon market. Data collection must 
be standardized, experts cultivated, and trainings conducted. This phase is only supposed 
to last for a few years until the onset of carbon trading at the national level. But, when the 
carbon market expands to include sectors beyond just electric power, the capacity 
building engine will inevitably find new fuel. China’s neoliberal climate policies are tied 
to national targets expressed on an international stage. As climate policy is increasingly 
envisioned as national-level chunks of a global goal, the nature of carbon markets across 
the world must also become uniform. A global carbon market is a perfect policy for a 
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perfectly uniform commodity, according to economy theory. China faces challenges in 
making a uniform carbon commodity across its massive domain filled with incredible 
variety. The story of China’s carbon market is not just one of incompatibility between 
state and market; rather, it is a bigger story of the taming of heterogeneity to enact a 
globally-derived national vision by the name of “market”.   
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CHAPTER 5: BELTS, ROADS, AND LEAKAGE 
THE SCALE OF IMPACT 
The Belt and Road Initiative (abbreviated BRI, full name: the Silk Road Economic Belt 
and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road) is often introduced in terms of its scale: one 
trillion dollars; the largest infrastructure program since the Marshall Plan (Nature 
Editorial 2019); two-thirds of the global population and one-third of the global economy 
involved (Ascensão et al. 2018).  
This sheer scale has ignited increasing international concern about environmental damage 
from the Belt and Road Initiative (Horvat and Gong 2019). These environmental 
concerns can be sorted into several buckets: concern about infrastructure development in 
ecologically sensitive areas, concern about the large amounts of raw materials needed, 
and concern about lock-in of environmentally harmful types of infrastructure, such as 
fossil fuel-related infrastructure (Ascensão et al. 2018).  
In response, China’s leaders have begun to develop and promote the idea of a green Belt 
and Road. Like the carbon market, the Belt and Road Initiative has been explicitly linked 
to ecological civilization in China’s policy guidances: “Promoting green Belt and Road is 
an internal need to share the ecological civilization philosophy and achieve sustainable 
development,” according to the Guidance on Promoting Green Belt and Road from 2017 
(Belt and Road Portal 2017). While the BRI was not originally tied to environmental 
goals as the carbon market was, it is now being integrated with the idea of an ecological 
civilization. At the same summit with President Obama where Xi Jinping announced that 
China’s national carbon market would start in 2017, their joint statement also read: 
“China will strengthen green and low-carbon policies and regulations with a view to 
strictly controlling public investment flowing into projects with high pollution and carbon 
emissions both domestically and internationally.” 
The sheer scale of China means it is seen as the key actor in many global decision points. 
Many frame the direction of BRI as a turning point for the global energy system, based 
on China’s decisions on what kinds of energy to fund and how those projects end up 
operating. “… the Belt and Road Initiative, with its huge volume of investment, is an 
opportunity we cannot miss to propel our world into a green future and to help countries 
transition to low-carbon, clean-energy pathways with new infrastructure that is 
sustainable and equitable,” said UN Secretary General António Guterres (UN 2019b).  
Although the BRI was first launched in 2013, overseas investment from China is far from 
a new phenomenon. China provided development aid to countries in Africa during the 
Mao era. In the mid-1990s, China’s State Council began to reform its development aid 
approach to incorporate economic goals, cooperation, and trade (Yeh and Wharton 2016). 
In 1999, China officially announced the Going Out policy (走出去战略), which 
supported domestic companies in investing overseas. For China, the line is thin between 
official aid and finance coming directly from the government, and commercial 
arrangements for private actors investing overseas (Bräutigam 2011). The BRI puts a new 
name, narrative, and institutional structure on an existing process, convenient for broader 
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geopolitical attention. This narrative shift was solidified by the creation of the China 
Agency for International Development Cooperation (CIDCA) in 2018, one of eight 
agencies that were created during the 2018 bureaucratic reforms alongside the MEE. 
CIDCA took on more responsibility for management of the BRI from the Ministry of 
Commerce.  
The high-profile attention to BRI and its potential impacts masks the continuity in 
China’s overseas engagement in infrastructure and development. Why is it that China’s 
overseas investment is increasingly being seen as a channel of environmental impact? In 
the next section, I discuss several conceptual frameworks that can mechanistically 
connect investment to environmental impact.  
 
FINANCE AS LEAKAGE 
To begin to unpack how to evaluate the environmental impact of BRI and Chinese 
overseas investment, I propose looking at BRI through the lens of leakage – the 
movement of pollution, through various channels discussed below, to an unregulated area 
once regulation occurs, such that total pollution ends up being higher than before 
regulation. This opens up a range of frameworks and empirical methods that are 
appropriate for understanding the aggregated effects of Chinese finance.   
I identify several areas of the literature that characterize leakage. The first area is the 
economics literature on trade and the environment. This literature explores the hypothesis 
that the advent of trade could increase pollution. Trade allows economic gains from 
specialization, but simple theoretical models illustrate that the impacts of trade on the 
environment are ambiguous, as channels can be delineated for both positive and negative 
effects (Copeland and Taylor 2003). Early empirical studies indicated that openness to 
trade is associated with less growth in pollution intensity within a country, likely because 
cleaner technologies are used by multi-national companies and for export-oriented 
production (Birdsall and Wheeler 1993). There is also a large body of literature using 
multiregional input-output (MRIO) databases to estimate embodied emissions in traded 
goods, which can be thought of as one avenue of leakage resulting directly from trade 
(Moran et al. 2018). That is, there is clear evidence from MRIO models that although 
emissions have decreased in many developed countries over the past two decades, net 
emissions have gone up because production is moving to poorer countries, which then 
export products to rich countries. While MRIO databases can help with accounting for 
emissions by final consumption, they ignore the economy-wide impacts of consumption 
decisions on prices. Many MRIO studies interpret their results around the assumption that 
imports cause emissions in the exporting country, when in fact this may not be a direct 
relationship (Jakob and Marschinski 2013). Partial and general equilibrium models 
directly simulate the movement of production across borders, not just the movement of 
products.  
The second area of leakage literature is the analysis of production and its associated 
pollution moving across borders in response to regulation – the classic definition of 
leakage. This is also sometimes known as the pollution haven hypothesis – the idea that 
firms are attracted to areas with weak environmental regulations. Partial and general 
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equilibrium models are used to simulate leakage as a response to different policy 
changes, though the choice of model also has theoretical implications – partial 
equilibrium models will necessarily show that a pollution tax produces a pollution haven 
effect, while general equilibrium models allow changes in factor prices to moderate cost 
increases in the taxed sectors, so the leakage effect may not be clear (Karp 2011). The 
magnitude and direction of these leakage effects depends on several key elasticities, such 
as the elasticity of fossil fuel supply or the substitution elasticity of factors of production.  
Finally, there is some literature on finance and investment as conduits for leakage. The 
hypothesized mechanism is that a decrease in the returns to capital in one region due to 
regulation causes firms to invest overseas, where pollution intensity is higher (Siikamaki 
et al. 2012). This is similar to the prior definition of leakage, but with explicit articulation 
of international investment flows. Empirical analysis of the pollution haven hypothesis 
has found that foreign ownership of a firm in a given country is associated with lower 
levels of energy use (Eskeland and Harrison 2003). Many studies assess the determinants 
of foreign direct investment (FDI), including weak environmental regulation. 
Interestingly, a study on the determinants of FDI from China found that ethnically 
Chinese sources of investment displayed more pollution haven-seeking behavior than non 
ethnically Chinese sources (Dean et al. 2009). Recent studies are beginning to apply the 
determinants-of-FDI framework to BRI. One study found that BRI host countries had 
more favorable exchange rates for the Chinese yuan, displayed more “market openness”, 
and had relatively less infrastructure compared to non-BRI countries (Liu et al. 2017). 
However, the average differences between BRI and non-BRI countries may disappear as 
more and more countries sign memorandums of understanding with China regarding the 
Belt and Road, raising questions about the utility of country-level analysis on the 
determinants of BRI. And more importantly, how do we move from determinants of 
inward investment to understanding the impacts of that investment? 
The BRI is increasingly being recognized as directed leakage, that is, a strategic effort on 
the part of China’s national government to provide a “soft landing” for domestic 
infrastructure companies that are facing shrinking markets within China by helping them 
expand abroad. However, framing of BRI impact is still simplistic, shirking the complex 
mechanisms that a leakage lens provides.  
Much of the media and advocacy discourse on BRI implies that finance directly translates 
into impact. This narrative was and is embodied in divestment campaigns, which urge 
entities to withdraw their investments from places or industries associated with a negative 
impact. From the divestment campaign against apartheid in South Africa in the 1980s to 
today’s fossil fuel divestment campaigns to combat climate change, the implication is 
that money can be wielded as a tool to lessen an undesirable impact. On the flip side, the 
investment from BRI is assumed to be causing environmental harms. For example, in a 
policy brief titled “The Carbon Consequences of China’s Overseas Investment in Coal”, 
the author estimated the lifetime CO2 emissions from 50 coal plants that had received 
support from Chinese financial institutions, a massive quantity of emissions (Gallagher 
2016). However, are these emissions direct “consequences” of this investment? Without 
Chinese financial support, many of these plants would likely still be built, so it is 
simplistic to directly attribute their lifetime emissions to one policy initiative. Yet many 
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such analyses assume that the scale of BRI will lead to a similar scale of impact.  
Consider also a scorecard a consortium of environmental NGOs assigned banks around 
the world based on the scale of their investment in coal power. Among all banks rate, 
three Chinese banks received F grades and the lowest rank of “Worst Banks” due to the 
total amount of their col power financing (Rainforest Action Network 2019).  
Is there something more than scale at play in these fears of BRI? If so, how do we assess 
the impact of specifically Chinese investment? Many of the environmental concerns 
about BRI arise from perception of BRI as a sudden and new phenomenon, and both its 
continuity and its relative impact are rarely considered. The empirical evaluations of 
leakage discussed above provide evidence for the environmental impact of outgoing 
finance, but for the most part academic research has yet to consider the nature of the 
investment sources and how this affects environmental impact. A growing number of 
specific case studies document social and environmental impacts for individual BRI 
projects, but they cannot shed light on relative or aggregated impacts. In the next chapter, 
I attempt to compare the relative environmental impacts of Chinese and non-Chinese 
finance across thousands of individual plants.  
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CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PERFORMANCE OF CHINA’S OVERSEAS COAL PLANTS11 
INTRODUCTION 
China’s leaders describe the Belt and Road Initiative as a massive effort to guide and 
expand Chinas overseas investment, facilitate South-South cooperation, and promote the 
Chinese model of development around the world (Ferdinand 2016). China frames its own 
overseas investment and aid as South-South cooperation that respects the sovereignty of 
host countries and promotes non-interference and mutual benefit (Yeh and Wharton 
2016). At the same time, various international media outlets and advocacy organizations 
have created the narrative of China going overseas with extractive investment projects 
that have negative social and environmental impact in host countries. China is critiqued 
for preying on resources, flooding markets with cheap Chinese commodities, and 
supplanting democracy and human rights with a governance-agnostic development model 
(Hofman and Ho 2012). These contrasting viewpoints in fact both reinforce the notion 
that Chinese investment is qualitatively unique (Lee 2014).  
Academic studies from the fields of geography, sociology, and area studies have formed 
a robust literature of case studies of China’s projects in other countries, examining social 
and environmental impact of China’s overseas investment case by case. In the economics 
literature, there are many studies on the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI), 
including weak environmental regulation (see Chapter 5). However, the former studies 
lack aggregated, comparable quantitative information, while the latter studies do not look 
at the impact of investment on environmental metrics (rather, they tend to investigate the 
reverse - the impact of environmental characteristics on investment inflows). This chapter 
aims to address both these shortcomings in the literature. It will provide evidence for the 
claim of the uniqueness of Chinese involvement, summarizing data on China’s overseas 
projects and comparing them to projects owned, designed, or built by other sources. As 
the Green Belt and Road becomes an increasing topic of study for research and policy 
institutions around the world, it is imperative to first establish a baseline understanding of 
the environmental impacts of China’s overseas finance.  
This study will compare coal-fired power plants in Asia receiving finance from different 
national sources. The project type to be assessed, coal-fired power plants, was selected 
due to ongoing policy dialogue about the role of international finance for coal-fired 
power plants. A number of NGOs, such as the Natural Resources Defense Council, and 
academic institutions, such as Boston University, actively track coal plant projects around 
the world. In recent years, a number of public institutions (such as the World Bank and 
the lending agencies of the U.S., U.K., and several other countries) have revoked 
development aid for coal power plants in developing countries, although these gaps are 
readily filled by private capital (Jones et al. 2011). These same groups, as well as 
environmental advocates, have expressed interest in the Belt and Road Initiative and 
                                                
11 This research was co-authored with Samuel Evans and will be submitted to a journal as an edited version 
of this chapter. 
71 
 
concern over its environmental impacts. As of 2016, almost half of Chinese investment in 
overseas power generation was for coal plants, as opposed to other generation 
technologies (Li et al. 2018). While the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (which 
China contributes finance to) has ruled out finance for coal-fired power plants, no 
Chinese banks have placed any restrictions on coal financing to date or to our knowledge 
(IEEFA 2019). 
The regional focus for this chapter is Asia: Asia is the first and primary frontier for Belt 
and Road projects, and it is a locus of coal plant development. While 41% of operating 
coal plants (by MW) are located in Asia (excluding China), 64% of planned coal plants 
and 81% of coal plants under construction are in Asia (CoalSwarm 2018).  
 
DATA 
We obtained plant-level data from the March 2018 version of the Platts World Electric 
Power Plants (WEPP) database. The WEPP is a regularly published global inventory of 
units generating electric power. For this analysis, we used a subset of the data for units 
with coal as their primary fuel. In addition, we only used data on plants that were located 
in Asia, according to the WEPP classifications. Asia includes the countries of 
Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, 
Mongolia, Myanmar, New Caledonia, New Zealand, North Korea, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
Because this analysis concerns the performance of China’s overseas projects, we also 
excluded coal plants within China. The final sample size is 4,290 plants. Below, Figure 
13 shows a map of the coal plants in this dataset that have latitude and longitude 
information (n = 2,516).  
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Figure 13: Map of Coal Plants in Asia (excluding China) 
 
We also constructed several key variables. We used the Platts data on parent company (n 
= 4,260 observations with data on parent company), architect or engineering company12  
(n = 1,778), and construction company (n = 1,733) to identify the country of origin for 
each of these types of companies. From the maps below (Figure 14), which show the 
number of each type of company originating from different countries, we can see that 
various countries specialize in different services related to coal plant management and 
construction, to some extent. For example, China has many distinct engineering 
companies involved in coal plants elsewhere in Asia, but has relatively few construction 
companies. However, the maps don’t reveal the relative sizes of the companies. India 
clearly has many companies of all types, while China, which tends to consolidate 
                                                
12 Platts describes these firms as the “primary architect or engineering company”, from here on simply 
referred to as engineering company 
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resources in large state-owned companies, may have a fewer number of companies but 
not necessarily a lower market share.  
 
 
Figure 14: Countries of Origin for Coal Plant Company Types 
 
Each type of company (parent, engineering, and construction) was then coded with a 
dummy ‘treatment’ variable for Chinese (D = 1) or non-Chinese (D = 0) ownership. Joint 
ventures with a Chinese company were coded as Chinese.13 This dummy variable is a 
proxy for receiving Chinese finance and thus being connected to management practices, 
technology choices, or other mechanisms unique to China’s overseas finance. Table 7 
shows the balance of observations of Chinese and non-Chinese companies by company 
                                                
13 Hong Kong and Taiwanese companies were coded as non-Chinese, although there is some empirical 
evidence that Sinophone and ethnically Chinese areas may have similar FDI patterns (Dean et al. 2009).  
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type. 
 
Table 7: Ownership by Company Type 
 Parent Company Engineering 
Company 
Construction 
Company 
Chinese 87 445 396 
Non-Chinese 4,173 1,312 1,309 
 
For outcome variables, we assess three metrics of environmental impact: CO2 emissions 
intensity, energy efficiency, and air pollution control technology. CO2 emissions 
intensity, or the emissions rate, is the product of the emissions factor and the heat rate of 
a given plant – the amount of CO2 a plant produces per unit of energy generated 
(Equation 6). We used data on plant-level emissions factors from the Global Coal Plant 
Tracker (GCPT), another plant-level database for coal plants around the world. We 
merged the GCPT data on emissions factors into the WEPP data. Heat rate was assigned 
based on the steam type of each plant (Table 8), and then adjusted for the year the plant 
was built and the capacity of the plant. This reflects the fact that older and smaller plants 
tend to be less efficient. This approach is based on the methodology proposed by 
SourceWatch as well as heat rate data from SourceWatch. Table 9 shows the assumed 
penalties for plant age and capacity (SourceWatch 2019a). We also validated this 
approach by comparing our calculated emissions intensity and EPA-reported emissions 
data for a sample of coal plants in the United States (see Appendix). 
 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 !"#$ !"!!"# ∗  𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 !"#!"! =  𝐶𝑂! 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (!"#$ !"!!"! )     
(Eq. 6) 
 
Table 8: Assumed Base Heat Rate by Steam Type 
Steam Type Heat Rate (Btu/MWh) 
Subcritical 8.98 
Supercritical 8.12 
Ultra-supercritical 7.76 
 
 
Table 9: Adjustments to Heat Rate for Capacity and Age of Plants 
 0-349 MW 350-449 MW 450+ MW 
0-9 Years +20% +10% 0% 
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10-19 Years +30% +20% +10% 
20-29 Years +40 +30% +20% 
30+ Years +45% +35% +25% 
 
For energy efficiency, we used steam temperature and steam pressure provided in the 
WEPP data. The higher the temperature and pressure of the steam produced by coal 
combustion used to power the turbine, the more efficient the process.  
For air pollution control technology, we used the WEPP data on particulate matter and 
sulfur dioxide control technology types to assess whether each plant’s technology was 
“best available technology” (BAT) or not. There were 10 different particulate matter 
control technologies and 16 different sulfur dioxide control technologies across all plants. 
For each of these types of pollution control technologies, we coded a dummy variable for 
BAT or non-BAT. To assess if a technology was BAT or not, we used the catalogue of 
BAT air pollution control technologies based on WEPP data from Purvis et al. 2014. For 
a list of technology types and their ratings, see the Appendix. Table 10 shows the final 
balance of observations on control technology classifications by air pollutant. 
 
Table 10: Number of Plants with Best Available Air Pollution Control Technologies 
 Particulate Matter Sulfur Dioxide 
Plants with BAT 247 857 
Plants with non-BAT 1,565 797 
 
Summary statistics for the final list of variables are provided in Table 11 below. Other 
categorical variables included in the regression analysis are plant status (operational, 
retired, planned, etc.), fuel type (anthracite, bituminous, lignite, etc.), and electricity type 
(utility, private, autoproducer).  
 
Table 11: Summary Statistics by Company Type 
 Chinese Parent Company Non-Chinese Parent Company 
 N Mean N Mean 
Capacity (MW) 87 455.5 4,203 263.7 
Year plant was built 49 2016 2,923 1995 
Steam pressure (bar) 8 206 1,408 124.2 
Steam temperature (°C) 8 554.8 1,395 519.9 
Emissions factor (kg 
CO2/TJ) 
44 97,030 2,304 97,810 
Heat rate (btu/kWh) 47 10,320 3,060 11,990 
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 Chinese Engineering 
Company 
Non-Chinese Engineering 
Company 
 N Mean N Mean 
Capacity (MW) 448 297.4 1,330 266.2 
Year plant was built 348 2012 1,154 2003 
Steam pressure (bar) 103 181 490 144 
Steam temperature (°C) 100 559.5 492 530.1 
Emissions factor (kg 
CO2/TJ) 
265 98,040 798 99,820 
Heat rate (btu/kWh) 360 11,110 1,181 11,570 
     
 Chinese Construction 
Company 
Non-Chinese Construction 
Company 
 N Mean N Mean 
Capacity (MW) 339 287.2 1,326 284.9 
Year plant was built 241 2012 1,174 2003 
Steam pressure (bar) 30 171.5 491 151 
Steam temperature (°C) 30 562.6 489 535.4 
Emissions factor (kg 
CO2/TJ) 
181 98,270 792 99,500 
Heat rate (btu/kWh) 255 11,250 1,202 11,510 
 
 
METHODS 
A simple comparison of the mean CO2 emissions intensity for Chinese and non-Chinese 
plants by company type indicates that Chinese companies have a lower average emissions 
intensity (Table 12). To explore this intriguing difference further, we control for other 
variables using ordinary least squares (OLS) and matching regressions.  
 
Table 12: Average Emissions Intensity (tons CO2/MWh) by Company Type 
 Parent Company Engineering 
Company 
Construction 
Company 
Chinese 1.046 1.156 1.167 
Non-Chinese 1.230 1.211 1.202 
 
We analyzed the effect of ownership of each type of company separately for each 
outcome variable. For assessing CO2 emissions, we used ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression to examine the effect of a Chinese parent, engineering, or construction 
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company on CO2 emissions intensity of plants. In our OLS regressions, we control for the 
status of the plant (operational, retired, etc.) and the type of the plant (i.e. producing 
utility scale electricity or electricity for industrial or commercial use on-site). Capacity 
and age of the plant are incorporated into the calculation of the heat rate (see the Data 
section), and are thus not included as explanatory variables. We did a log transformation 
of the outcome variable, which produces a more normal distribution of values.  
Because random assignment of ownership of these companies can’t be approximated, we 
use a matching technique to attempt to isolate variation from country of origin of these 
companies. In addition, the imbalance in sample size for observations of Chinese and 
non-Chinese companies indicates a need for matching (see Table 11, summary statistics). 
For analyzing CO2 emissions, the Chinese and non-Chinese companies were matched 
based on the same variables controlled for in the OLS regression: status and electricity 
type. We use the MatchIt package in R for the matching analyses. 
We take a similar approach to estimating the effects of Chinese companies on plant 
energy efficiency. We use OLS to estimate the effect of a Chinese company on steam 
temperature and steam pressure, controlling for the size and status of the plant, the type 
of coal used, the steam type (i.e. subcritical or supercritical), country, and electricity type. 
We use the same control variables for the matching analysis. We again did a log 
transformation of the outcome variables of steam type and steam pressure. 
Finally, we perform a similar analysis for each of the air pollution control technologies. 
Since the outcome variable is binary, we perform a logistic regression, controlling for 
size, status, fuel type, steam type, country, and electricity type of the plant. We also 
perform a matching analysis, matching on the same variables as in the logistic regression.  
 
RESULTS 
Table 13 presents the results from our analysis of CO2 emissions intensity (or rate). We 
show the coefficient for the effect of Chinese ownership, controlling for status and type 
of coal plant. The OLS and matching specifications both indicate a statistically 
significant effect similarly large in magnitude for plants with Chinese parent companies - 
that is, plants with Chinese parent companies have around 10-13% lower emissions 
intensity. We find that the effect on CO2 emissions rate is less for a Chinese engineering 
company, around 3% lower than non-Chinese companies for the OLS specification. The 
matching coefficient was similar in magnitude by not statistically significant. For a 
Chinese construction company, emissions rates are 5% lower than non-Chinese 
companies based on our matching analysis.  
Table 13: CO2 Emissions Results, Coefficient of Chinese Ownership Dummy 
 Dependent Variable:  log(Emissions Factor * Heat Rate) 
 OLS Matching 
Chinese Parent Company -0.101*** -0.135** 
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(0.029) (0.047) 
Chinese Engineering 
Company 
-0.031* -0.029 
(0.013) (0.017) 
Chinese Construction 
Company 
-0.014 -0.048** 
(0.014) (0.017) 
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
 
We also examined the interaction effect of steam type and plant ownership, variables 
which are independent for all types of companies based on a chi square test. We used a 
dummy variable for subcritical and non-subcritical plants and found that the interaction 
term was significant for parent companies, indicating that Chinese ownership of parent 
company has a unique effect on CO2 emissions intensity for subcritical plants, while CO2 
emissions intensity of supercritical and ultrasupercritical plants are less likely to be 
affected by Chinese ownership of parent company. This is an interesting interaction 
effect given the focus of international media and advocates on critiquing China’s 
investments in subcritical coal plants overseas (see e.g. Shearer et al. 2019). Given the 
difficulty in estimating plant-level CO2 emissions, these results indicate the need for 
further analysis of variable interactions while improving data quality.  
Table 14 presents the results for the energy efficiency analysis. Higher steam temperature 
and pressure means higher thermodynamic efficiency in converting coal into electric 
power. We find that Chinese engineering companies and construction companies are 
associated with higher energy efficiency in coal plants, mirroring the direction of results 
for CO2 emissions intensity (since higher energy efficiency would tend to be associated 
with relatively lower emissions intensity). Coal plants with Chinese engineering 
companies have around 5-6% higher steam temperature than those with non-Chinese 
engineering companies, and 17-38% higher steam pressure, an effect that is significant 
across the OLS and matching specifications. Plants with Chinese construction companies 
have around 4% higher steam temperature than those with non-Chinese construction 
companies, and 12-14% higher steam pressure, an effect that is significant across 
specifications. However, the effect of a Chinese parent company is lower in magnitude 
and not significant across specifications.  
 
Table 14: Energy Efficiency Results, Coefficient of Chinese Ownership Dummy 
 Dependent Variable:  log(Steam Temperature) 
 OLS Matching 
Chinese Parent Company 
0.003 -0.063 
(0.037) (0.040) 
Chinese Engineering 
Company 
0.047*** 0.060*** 
(0.010) (0.015) 
Chinese Construction 0.045*** 0.044** 
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Company (0.009) (0.016) 
 Dependent Variable:  log(Steam Pressure) 
 OLS Matching 
Chinese Parent Company 
-0.016 0.469 
(0.141) (0.263) 
Chinese Engineering 
Company 
0.168*** 0.353*** 
(0.034) (0.066) 
Chinese Construction 
Company 
0.121*** 0.147* 
(0.035) (0.063) 
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 15 presents the results for the air pollution control technology analysis. Due to the 
smaller sample sizes, the analysis of air pollution BAT is less robust and has large 
standard errors. BAT is coded as 1 and non-BAT as 0, so in interpreting the results we 
find that positive coefficients indicate a higher likelihood of having BAT technologies. 
We find that a Chinese parent company means a plant is more likely to have BAT for 
sulfur dioxide control technologies, while a Chinese engineering company significantly 
reduces the quality of sulfur dioxide control technologies. These contradictory results 
need to be further explored. Other coefficients were not significant, and none of the 
particulate matter coefficients were significant.  
 
 
Table 15: Air Pollution Control Results, Coefficient of Chinese Ownership Dummy 
 Dependent Variable:  Particulate Matter BAT Dummy 
 OLS Matching 
Chinese Parent Company 
-1.613 -0.836 
(1.074) (0.945) 
Chinese Engineering 
Company 
-0.303 -0.074 
(0.455) (0.384) 
Chinese Construction 
Company 
-0.481 -0.434 
(0.492) (0.422) 
 Dependent Variable:  Sulfur Dioxide BAT Dummy 
 OLS Matching 
Chinese Parent Company 
3.338*** 1.935** 
(1.207) (0.859) 
Chinese Engineering -0.666* 0.164 
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Company (0.262) (0.181) 
Chinese Construction 
Company 
-0.274 -0.019 
(0.257) (0.194) 
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
This paper provides the first systematic comparison of Chinese and non-Chinese coal 
plants outside of China, collecting and analyzing data on environmental performance 
across three metrics: CO2 emissions intensity, energy efficiency, and air pollution control 
technology. We find compelling evidence that plants with a Chinese parent company, 
engineering company, or construction company often perform better in these metrics than 
other plants. We can also see in Figure 15 that there are differences across company 
portfolios by steam type of coal plant (subcritical, supercritical, and ultra-supercritical). 
The steam type of the coal plant plays a large role in CO2 emissions and energy 
efficiency. Mirroring our findings, some countries, including China, have a relatively 
cleaner portfolio. There is much more research that can be done with our dataset, 
exploring the environmental performance coal portfolios of other countries with coal 
plants in Asia.  
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Figure 15: Country of Origin Portfolios by Steam Type 
 
This study has many limitations. The first issue is limited data – for future analysis, we 
recommend validating the Platts dataset against the Global Coal Plant Tracker and 
checking the robustness of the results for each dataset. The study also does not engage 
with the broader question of what kinds of electric power stations China is involved with 
in other Asian countries. That is, we do not investigate any sort of ‘displacement effect’ 
or fuel switching based on the broader portfolios of different countries involved in the 
electric power sector in Asia. In the future, we hope to expand this analysis to natural gas 
plants, which could increase the robustness of the analysis, and investigate the factors 
that determine what type of energy projects Chinese companies choose to invest in. In 
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addition, because we lack time series data, we are unable to characterize how long a 
given plant has had Chinese involvement, which could be an important consideration 
given that around half of Chinese ownership of overseas power plants has been through 
mergers and acquisitions rather than greenfield investment (Li et al. 2018). Although our 
results are robust to inclusion of the year the plant was built, data on the influx of Chinese 
involvement at different points in time could open up a new set of analyses. Finally, we 
hope to improve upon our characterization of Chinese company ownership as proxy for 
finance, such as by testing the effects of cumulative ownership (i.e. if Chinese ownership 
of parent, engineering, and construction company has a greater effect than ownership of 
just one of those companies for a given plant).  
This analysis provides suggestive evidence that plants with Chinese parent, engineering, 
or construction companies perform better in terms of emissions intensity and energy 
efficiency than those with companies from other countries. We are not advocating for 
increased investment in coal. However, for the countries around the world that continue 
to actively build out coal power, BRI investment could be a comparably better option for 
low-environmental-impact coal plants. In this analysis, we use parent, engineering, and 
construction companies as proxies for financial flows, suggesting a potential mechanism 
through which differential environmental impacts occur (company practices). The next 
chapter explores mechanisms by which specifically Chinese investment could explain 
these relative differences in environmental performance of coal plants and infrastructure 
projects more broadly.   
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CHAPTER 7: MECHANISMS OF IMPACT 
COMPANY ROLES 
While the prior chapter shed light on trends across thousands of coal plants in Asia, this 
chapter returns to case studies to try and understand the mechanisms that might drive our 
findings – that coal plants in Asia with Chinese parent, engineering, and construction 
companies are correlated with lower emissions intensity and higher energy efficiency that 
plants managed by companies from other countries, controlling for plant size, age, and 
type.  
The prior chapter used company involvement as a proxy for finance in order to evaluate 
the effect of Chinese involvement. The results suggest that the companies that manage, 
design, and build coal plants are related to relative performance. How might this work in 
terms of each type of company’s role?  
Parent companies are hypothesized to mediate external pressures (i.e. from government, 
activists, and shareholders) and potentially translate these policies into a specific plant’s 
adoption of environmental management practices (Delmas and Toffel 2004). To 
understand the Chinese companies involved in overseas coal plant development, I briefly 
profile the Chinese companies involved in the last chapter’s analysis. The top 5 Chinese 
parent companies with the most coal plants elsewhere in Asia are CIIDG Erdos Hongjun 
Electric Power, China Hongqiao Group, Huadian, Datang, and Gezhouba. Huadian and 
Datang are among the largest state-owned power generation companies in China, while 
Gezhouba is one of the largest construction and engineering companies in China. China 
Hongqiao Group is a state-owned aluminum producer, and the largest aluminum producer 
in the world. CIIDG Erdos Hongjun Electric Power is a joint venture between a 
Cambodian investment development group and a Chinese electric power company. For 
their overseas endeavors, these parent companies receive financial support from Chinese 
state policy institutions, like the China Development Bank, as well as commercial banks, 
like Bank of China. These companies are directly subject to various guidelines issued by 
the NDRC and other state agencies. For example, in addition to complying with host 
country environmental regulations, firms are requested “to undertake environmental 
impact assessments for their overseas construction and business operations, to apply for 
environment related permits from the host country… to reduce the emission of pollutants 
through clean production, and also to actively engage in ecological restoration” 
(Gallagher and Qi 2018).14 While many of these guidelines are voluntary or unenforced, 
Chinese parent companies could direct plant-level technology choices and operational 
practices in order to meet China’s and host country’s suggestions for environmental 
performance.  
The top Chinese engineering companies from our analysis are large private companies 
that specialize in engineering services for the electric power sector. Many of these same 
companies are also the top construction companies, such as SEPCO3, the Shandong 
Electric Power Construction Corporation. Such companies are vertically integrated, 
                                                
14 For a full summary of these policies, see Gallagher and Qi 2018. 
84 
 
providing logistics and shipping, equipment, design services, etc. Engineering and 
construction services are often bundled together in the form of EPC (Engineering, 
Procurement, Construction) contracts. Though there is no information on this in our 
dataset, these arrangements may even go further than just engineering and construction, 
with Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) projects or Design-Build-Operate (DBO) projects 
that receive concessional finance through public-private partnerships (World Bank Group 
2019). Chinese state or commercial banks could provide finance for such arrangements. 
The technology selection, operation, and maintenance of these plants by Chinese 
companies is an obvious channel for environmental performance. The China Daily waxed 
poetic about one such arrangement for a supercritical coal plant in Bangladesh: the 
China-Bangladesh joint venture company, in a Build-Own-Operate project, “has a 
professional operation and maintenance team, an efficient management team and a 
scientific management system, and will spare no effort in ensuring the safe, stable and 
efficient operation of the units after they become operational… the special coal-
unloading terminal makes use of seawater DC cooling and seawater desulfurization 
technology. Most of the equipment for the project will be made in China” (China Daily 
2017). 
Given the significant role of different types of companies in directing Chinese finance 
and its impacts, painting BRI’s environmental impact as a function of geopolitical 
motives, as is often done in the media, is too broad a brushstroke. While some studies 
attempt to fit the BRI process into political theories, they lack rich empirical evidence. 
Environmental critics describe BRI host countries as “vulnerable”, with already-stressed 
resources and “underdeveloped” governance. Such portrayals gloss over the complexity 
of the companies on the ground that are enacting BRI. Although Chinese institutions that 
operate overseas – like the China Development Bank, argued to be the world’s most 
powerful bank (Sanderson and Forsythe 2012) – are portrayed as monolithic entities, the 
global integration of China’s overseas finance is not an inevitable process that unfolds 
with full cooperation and coordination of state actors. BRI is not a coherent ‘grand 
strategy’ that state capitalists follow in an orderly manner (Jones and Zeng 2019). Rather, 
Chinese financiers are a diverse group of actors who encounter even more diverse 
institutions in local government settings (Lu and Schönweger 2017). In some cases, such 
as the Chinese-funded Kamchay dam in Cambodia, where local energy bureaucrats 
overrode environmental impact assessments by citing the pressing need for energy 
supply, the dominance of certain local actors and their goals plays out in the actual 
implementation of projects, leading to different scales of environmental impact 
(Hensengerth 2017). Our analysis in Chapter 6 attempted to shed light on the aggregate 
effects of these dynamics using empirical data. 
 
HYPOTHESIZED MECHANISMS 
Besides through company-level choices, there could be other mechanisms through which 
specifically Chinese finance and management of a plant lead to better environmental 
performance. In my master’s thesis, I found that Chinese-funded and constructed alumina 
plants in Vietnam had much higher energy intensity than average for the industry, and I 
identified several mechanisms that might explain why this was the case. Local opponents 
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of the bauxite mines and alumina plants alleged that Chinese managers and workers were 
unfamiliar with the local geology and brought outdated technologies to Vietnam 
(Springer 2018). Despite China’s claims that their overseas finance is an apolitical boon 
to developing countries, Chinese finance often comes with several conditions (Nature 
Editorial 2019). In Vietnam, disgruntled locals complained that the conditions were 
always the same three things: Chinese currency, Chinese workers, and Chinese 
equipment. Although in the case of Vietnam’s alumina plants I found evidence 
suggesting these conditions drove worse environmental performance, they could 
potentially also improve environmental performance if Chinese technology and practices 
were better than the alternative.  
In a systematic review of media articles on coal and BRI published since January 2019 in 
CoalWire and the RWR Belt and Road Monitor, two aggregators of media and advocacy 
coverage, I identified several consistent hypotheses for why Chinese-funded plants might 
perform better or worse than others. Many of these hypothesized channels could exert 
positive or negative influence on environmental impacts, depending on the local context 
in each case.  
The first hypothesis is that China’s tremendous financial resources lead to exceptional 
conditions regarding project costs. From a negative point of view, excess financial 
resources disincentivize operators from being efficient. The South China Morning Post 
cited China Development Bank’s bailout of coal-intensive South African utility Eskom, 
which has faced financial and political struggles, allowing it to continue to “mismanage” 
power plants now using Chinese technology (Nicholas 2019). As discussed in Chapter 5, 
the increasing perception that BRI is meant to help China’s domestic companies find new 
markets elsewhere fuels this suspicion that Chinese finance, especially from state policy 
banks, will spare no expense for projects abroad. On the other hand, China’s tremendous 
financial resources could improve the environmental performance of projects. For 
example, after China banned the import of F-grade coal, nearby Mongolian coal plants 
have been stuck with this glut of low-quality coal. Chinese operated plants in Mongolia, 
however, can afford to source better quality coal (SouthGobi Resources 2019). For the 
Hwange coal plant, the largest power plant in Zimbabwe, Chinese construction 
contractors signed an EPC contract with Zimbabwe to upgrade and expand the station 
(SourceWatch 2019b), potentially enabling state-of-the-art technology with superior 
environmental performance.  
The second hypothesis is that plants receiving Chinese finance are given special 
treatment due to their political status, which leads to differing environmental 
performance. A coal plant in Serbia, constructed by a Chinese company and financed by 
the China ExIm Bank along with the Serbian government, was accused of beginning 
construction without environmental impact assessments or construction permits (Beyond 
Coal 2019). Lack of assessments or preparations could lead to higher environmental 
impact. In Vietnam, an audit of a Chinese-funded coal plant in Binh Thuan province 
criticized the provincial government and the national ministries of environment, industry 
and trade for inadequate supervision of the project and lack of proper assessment of 
environmental impacts due to a desire to please Chinese partners (CoalWire, March 13 
edition). However, given increasing international scrutiny of BRI, Chinese plants could 
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potentially be held to higher environmental standards given attention and political 
sensitivity. The advisor to the Pakistan prime minister on climate change, Malik Amin 
Aslam, who was critical of the many planned coal plants in Pakistan receiving Chinese 
funding, said Pakistan will ensure “the strictest possible environmental controls” with 
monitoring systems “to minimize and control any damages” (Third Pole 2018). In 
addition, as BRI host countries become more active in guiding BRI investment, they may 
form more mechanisms for oversight and regulation that affect BRI projects more than 
other projects. For example, Myanmar has formed a steering committee to manage BRI 
projects (Xinhua 2018).   
The final hypothesis is that Chinese funders are interested in different projects than other 
funders. Chinese financiers are accused of supporting otherwise unprofitable projects that 
wouldn’t receive finance for elsewhere, and tend to be less efficient (Beyond Coal 2019). 
While some accuse China of investing in politically unstable areas, thus supporting 
pariah regimes, China has defended itself by saying that traditional investors have already 
saturated the desirable markets. From the perspective of relatively better performance, 
perhaps Chinese funders can pick the best projects in such areas because they are the only 
funders, meaning those projects will perform relatively better overall. “For solar and 
wind or other renewables we can get financing from anywhere,” said the special assistant 
to Pakistan’s prime minister on the power sector, though “finding international financing 
for coal had been difficult, with China the only country willing to invest” (Ebrahim 
2019).  
Although our empirical analysis suggests that Chinese funded coal plants tend to perform 
better than their counterparts, it is understandable that there is a perception that Chinese 
projects are worse. The sheer scale of BRI means that Chinese projects receive more 
attention and scrutiny. For example, a breakdown at a Chinese funded coal plant in Sri 
Lanka led to officials being inundated with complaints – the plant provided 78% of Sri 
Lanka’s power supply (Newsfirst 2019). Nevertheless, I believe that the scale of BRI 
should not be the main indicator of its potential impact. As our earlier analysis attempts 
to do, there should be apples-to-apples comparison of projects that could receive funding 
from a variety of sources, including Chinese banks and Chinese companies. As Chapter 5 
laid out, China’s overseas investment is not new, nor is its impact simply a function of 
the amount of money.  
Our analysis and this collection of hypotheses are but a first step to understanding the 
impact of Chinese finance. To assemble a more comprehensive set of hypotheses and 
gather more empirical evidence regarding any uniqueness of Chinese finance, I 
recommend a systematic literature review of the many rich case studies in the academic 
literature on overseas Chinese projects. In addition, other indicators beside environmental 
impact could be considered, such as social conflict. New methodological tools, such as 
web scraping, could be used to systematically gather data on incidents of environmental 
or social conflict for Chinese-funded projects.  
The current efforts of advocates, scholars, and NGOs to track and characterize flows of 
China’s overseas finance are laudable. However, just knowing dollar amounts is not 
enough; this data should be combined with information on environmental and social 
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performance to inform more detailed analyses of aggregate impacts, adopting 
frameworks that enable a broader understanding of how finance is connected to impact.   
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
The two parts of my dissertation illustrate how two of China’s major ecological 
civilization policies – the national carbon market and the Belt and Road Initiative – are 
being enacted, and how they are related to economic and environmental impacts both 
inside and outside of China. Through this research, I have sought to understand the 
premise of China’s ecological civilization concept – that China is uniquely positioned to 
simultaneously guide economic growth and environmental protection. 
In Part 1, I introduced China’s carbon market in the context of ongoing economic reform 
in many sectors of China’s economy. I used a computable general equilibrium model to 
directly simulate structural economic transition in China and its interaction with a 
national carbon market, looking at effects through 2050. I found evidence that with 
certain policy designs, China can increase aggregate economic growth while reducing 
emissions, based on growth in the lower emissions intensity service sector. Given the 
many necessary simplifications in this modeling analysis, I also sought a qualitative 
approach to understanding the nature of China’s carbon market. Through field visits, 
interviews, and participant observation, I showed how China’s carbon market is a 
challenging exercise in standardization of carbon management. I began by examining the 
ways emissions data vary in quality and quantity, and how the emissions monitoring, 
reporting, and verification process is attempting to standardize emissions data. I showed 
how expertise is constructed and consolidated with the help of computational models. 
Finally, I concluded that capacity building is the engine that drives standardization, and 
that the market for capacity building is lucrative and productive where the national 
carbon market itself is not, thus encapsulating the neoliberal spirit of an ecological 
civilization policy.  
In Part 2, I aimed to make methodological and conceptual contributions to the 
understanding of the potential environmental impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. 
Since international discourse on BRI often implies that Chinese overseas finance is 
qualitatively unique, I sought to test this claim using data on coal plants in Asia, the first 
frontier of BRI. I used regression techniques to examine the relationship between Chinese 
finance and several indicators of environmental impact. I found that plants owned, 
managed, or built by Chinese companies tend to have lower emissions rates and higher 
energy efficiency than those associated with non-Chinese companies. These findings 
indicate that Chinese ownership of parent, engineering, or construction companies for 
overseas coal plants can affect the environmental performance of the plants. I sought to 
identify several hypotheses for how this might occur, such as exceptional conditions due 
to the scale of finance, or special political treatment of overseas Chinese projects by host 
governments. Taken together, this part of the dissertation aimed to advance the 
conversation about the environmental impact of BRI through careful consideration of 
comparative impact and the mechanisms through which financial involvement could 
influence relative environmental performance.  
This dissertation makes several methodological and topical contributions to the literature. 
Chapter 3 adds to the small number of studies that explicitly model structural economic 
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transition in China, and frames this analysis as an assessment of the ecological 
civilization premise. The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in Part 1 is 
a novel methodological approach, and one that is necessary for understanding the 
complex dynamics of carbon markets in China’s ‘partial reform’ economy. In addition, 
Chapter 4 re-frames the process of carbon market development in China as an issue of 
standardization rather than marketization, which assumes that China’s state-market 
tension is inefficient, when in fact it has generated its own benefits for many actors 
involved. In Part 2, my empirical analysis is the first apples-to-apples comparison of 
environmental performance of Chinese and non-Chinese plants, providing suggestive 
evidence for an ongoing debate in the policy and advocacy realm about the role of 
Chinese finance for coal power. In addition, I propose framing the environmental impacts 
of finance around leakage, which opens up a broader range of empirical methods for 
analysis.  
In fact, leakage is another thread that ties the carbon market and BRI together. As 
environmental regulations like the national carbon market are adopted within China, the 
BRI is increasingly recognized as a concerted effort on the part of national policymakers 
to help domestic companies in regulated sectors find new opportunities abroad. This link 
is a ripe area for future research. What will the net environmental impact of these policies 
be, and to what extent will the ecological civilization ethos be applied to BRI projects?  
While the results of this dissertation are generally not oriented towards specific policy 
recommendations, the findings have several theoretical and methodological implications. 
First, the results from Part 1 suggest that the carbon market is embedded in a broad 
landscape of social dynamics. Chapter 3 suggests that social spending policies can 
facilitate structural economic transition and support the goals of the carbon market, while 
Chapter 4 shows that a diverse network of actors build expertise and livelihoods through 
engaging with the carbon market. In Part 2, my results indicate that China should not 
necessarily be considered a coal financing pariah, because of the relatively better 
environmental performance of Chinese owned, built, and operated plants. These findings 
could have major implications for how international policy and advocacy organizations 
engage with BRI. Taken together, both parts of the dissertation illustrate the need for 
interdisciplinary approaches to the study of complex policies. Any policy on the scale of 
those covered in this dissertation will take years if not decades to design and enact, and 
thus will require expansive methodological approaches to be understood.  
Ecological civilization is proclaimed by China’s leaders to be a uniquely Chinese 
concept, and it has become a guiding ideology for many of China’s policies. In this 
dissertation, I explore the enactment and implementation of two major ecological 
civilization policies, shedding light on Chinese policymaking and its economic and 
environmental impacts from an interdisciplinary perspective. With economic and 
environmental implications both inside and outside of China, these policies will shape 
our world for years to come.  
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APPENDIX  
ABBREVIATIONS 
BAT – Best Available Technology 
BRI – Belt and Road Initiative 
Btu – British thermal unit 
CDM – Clean Development Mechanism 
CEC – China Electricity Council 
CEMS – Continuous Emissions Monitoring Systems 
CES – constant elasticity of substitution 
CIDCA – China Agency for International Development Cooperation 
CGE – computable general equilibrium 
CO2 – carbon dioxide 
CO2e – carbon dioxide equivalents 
DRC – Development and Reform Commission 
EPA – Environmental Protection Agency 
EPB – Environmental Protection Bureau 
EPC – engineering, procurement, and construction 
ETS – emissions trading system  
EU ETS – European Union emissions trading system 
FDI – foreign direct investment 
GCPT – Global Coal Plant Tracker 
GDP – gross domestic product 
GHG – greenhouse gas 
Gt – gigaton 
GTAP – Global Trade Analysis Project 
INDC – Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
kWh – kilowatt hour 
MEE – Ministry of Ecology and Environment 
MRIO – multi-regional input-output 
MRV – monitoring, reporting, and verification 
MW – megawatt 
MWh – megawatt hour 
NCSC – National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation 
NDRC – National Development and Reform Commission 
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
SAM – social accounting matrix 
SOE – state-owned enterprise 
TJ – terajoule 
UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
WEPP – World Electric Power Plants database  
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AIR POLLUTION CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES 
The tables below list the air pollution control technologies in use in our dataset for the 
analysis in Chapter 6, based on data from Platts. We also classified these technologies by 
their BAT and non-BAT status according to Purvis et al. 2014.  
 
Table 16: Particulate Matter Control Technologies 
Control Technology Classification 
Baghouse BAT 
Baghouse/Wet ESP BAT 
Combination (usually ESP preceded by multiclones) BAT 
Cold side ESP BAT 
Electrostatic-fabric integrated precipitator BAT 
Electrostatic precipitator (ESP) Non-BAT 
ESP/Baghouse BAT 
Hot side ESP Non-BAT 
Mechanical particulate control device Non-BAT 
Wet particulate scrubber BAT 
Wet ESP BAT 
Water-film venturi particulate scrubber BAT 
Water-film venturi particulate scrubber/ESP BAT 
 
 
Table 17: Sulfur Dioxide Control Technologies 
Control Technology Classification 
Atmospheric circulating fluidized bed boiler BAT 
Regenerable aqueous amine FGD system BAT 
Circulating bed FGD scrubber BAT 
Circulating dry FGD scrubber Non-BAT 
Compliance fuel (fuel that allows plant to meet 
applicable air quality standards) 
Non-BAT 
Semi-dry circulating fluidized bed FGD scrubber BAT 
Coal washing Non-BAT 
First generation wet sulfuric acid FGD system BAT 
Wet limestone bubbling reactor FGD system BAT 
Double alkali FGD scrubber Non-BAT 
Dry FGD scrubber Non-BAT 
Dry lime FGD scrubber, hydrated lime injection Non-BAT 
Flue gas desulfurization (FGD) BAT 
Wet limestone FGD scrubber BAT 
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Limestone injection into furnace with calcium oxide 
activation 
Non-BAT 
Lime injection BAT 
Magnesium oxide FGD scrubber BAT 
Ammonia or ammonium sulfate FGD scrubber BAT 
Novel integrated desulfurization scrubber (dry lime) BAT 
Pressurized fluidized bed combustor BAT 
Reflux circulating fluidized bed FGD scrubber 
(semi-dry design) 
BAT 
Regenerative activated coke technology system BAT 
Spray dry FGD scrubber (typically using lime 
reagent) 
BAT 
Spray dry FGD scrubber BAT 
Semi-dry lime FGD system BAT 
Seawater FGD scrubber BAT 
Wet calcium carbonate FGD scrubber BAT 
Wet carbide sludge FGD scrubber BAT 
Wet FGD BAT 
Wet lime FGD scrubber BAT 
Wet limestone FGD scrubber BAT 
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EMISSIONS CALCULATION VALIDATION 
We checked the method used to calculate plant-level CO2 emissions rates in Chapter 6 by 
validating based on actual reported plant-level emissions in U.S. coal plants. Using the 
EPA FLIGHT tool, we downloaded data on coal plant reported emissions for the most 
recent reporting year, 2017. We then randomly sampled one operational coal plant from 
each U.S. state with coal plants in the 2018 GCPT dataset. We compared the calculated 
emissions rate in the GCPT dataset to the back-calculated emissions rate from the EPA 
for each sampled plant. We back-calculated emissions rates for each plant by converting 
EPA annual CO2 emissions to a rate assuming a capacity factor of 0.525, the official 
International Energy Agency estimate for global average coal plant capacity factor. The 
average error was 35%, indicating that our approximation of emissions rate was 
reasonable but could certainly be improved. We believe that the outliers in Figure XX are 
plants with very high or very low capacity factors.  
 
 
Figure 16: Comparison of Calculated and Reported Emissions Rates  
